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ABSTRACT 
 
Pretrial publicity (PTP), defined as any news story about a case not yet in trial, 
has been shown to affect trial outcomes.  Results, however, are mixed, with studies 
finding strong effects, others weaker effects, and some no effects.  These differences are 
sometimes attributed to methodology and study stimuli.  In the present research, the 
effect of participant attitudes was explored.  Participant attitudes can have a strong 
influence on perceptions about a piece of information, and could explain differences in 
use of PTP as well as findings that judicial remedies to alleviate PTP effects are 
ineffective.  Participants were exposed to one of four news articles, containing 
information on confession, prior record, or resisting arrest, or only neutral information.  
They took a measure of legal attitudes, including questions relevant to the negative PTP 
information received, and then read a trial transcript of an assault on a middle-aged man.  
Participants then received standard jury instructions, a specific admonition to ignore PTP, 
or a specific admonition with the additional statement that PTP can be unreliable.   
Results differed by content of PTP.  Participants receiving confession PTP 
assigned higher guilt ratings overall; strong instructions increased guilt ratings and guilty 
verdicts among participants receiving confession PTP.  Participants receiving resisting 
arrest PTP and specific instructions assigned higher guilt ratings than participants 
receiving neutral PTP and specific instructions.  Finally, among participants receiving 
prior record PTP, a weak attitude toward a prior record as indicative of guilt and standard 
xii 
instructions resulted in lower guilt ratings than participants receiving neutral PTP; the 
effects were reversed for participants with a strong attitude that having a prior record 
indicates guilt.  Stronger instructions weakened the effects of attitude and PTP.  Results 
suggest that instructions specifically addressing PTP information may only ameliorate 
PTP effects in certain situations, and that psychological reactance, thought suppression 
and ironic processes provide better explanations for use of PTP, despite instructions to 
discourage use, than belief perseverance.  Additionally, the effects of other attitudes 
specific to the case and the relationship between guilt ratings and verdicts were explored.  
Future research should continue to explore relationship among attitudes, evidence, PTP, 
and outcomes.   
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The study of social psychology began as a study of attitudes (McGuire, 1989).  
Though this subfield has expanded to include a variety of important research topics, 
including the ways in which psychological processes can influence legal cases, attitudes 
remain an important aspect of many social psychological inquiries (Ottati, Edwards, & 
Krumdick, 2005).  The present project seeks to expand on past research, by examining 
the effect of attitudes on processing of legal information; reactions to and influences of 
pretrial publicity may depend in part on an individual’s attitudes about the legal 
information contained in the media.  These attributes can influence an individual’s 
behavior in this legal context, the most important behavior being the individual’s verdict 
preference.  These issues have never been studied empirically, so the current research 
project will study these variables. 
Though the eventual verdict from a deliberating jury is the only aspect that 
concerns the legal system, social psychological research has shown that individual verdict 
preferences can have a strong influence on eventual verdict, even if not all jurors are in 
total agreement at the beginning of deliberation.  Kalven and Zeisel (1966) for instance 
found that the majority verdict at the beginning of deliberation was the final verdict in 
over 90% of trials, a finding that has been confirmed by both experimental and field 
studies (for a review, see Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying, & Pryce, 2001).  Where 
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individual jurors start out is a good indication of where the entire jury will end.  Any 
information that may bias jurors individually before they step into the jury room, then, is 
of great concern. 
One issue that can bias jurors before they enter the jury room, or even the 
courtroom, is pretrial publicity (PTP).  One of the first instances of PTP was the Aaron 
Burr treason trial in 1807 (United States v. Burr, 1807).  Burr argued that an impartial 
jury could not be seated due to the prejudicial stories published by a local newspaper.  
This was the first time the court had dealt with these issues, and with no research or 
precedent to guide them, determined that knowledge of a case does not exempt a 
potential juror.  It must be shown that the juror is biased against the defendant and that 
this bias would prevent the juror from being able to decide the case based on the 
evidence.  Though PTP has come before the court many times since then, the “actual 
bias” ruling has rarely changed (Curtner & Kassier, 2005). 
The issue of PTP is in the middle of a tug-of-war between two Constitutional 
rights: the right to a free press and the right of defendants to a fair trial – which is why 
PTP is often referred to as the free press-fair trial debate.  Neither of these rights is 
qualified in any way, though some (e.g. Chesterman, 1997) have argued that the First 
Amendment is given greater weight than the Sixth; there is nothing in the Constitution 
stating that the freedom of the press can be suspended in certain cases, leading many to 
argue that censorship of the press is unconstitutional, regardless of the motive.  
Therefore, those involved with the legal system are called to maintain a defendant’s 6th 
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amendment rights despite the freedom of the press to print information about the 
defendant. 
Once a jury has been seated, they are asked by the court to avoid any press 
coverage of the trial, and judges can make it more difficult for jurors to obtain 
information from the media during the trial by using such options as sequestering the jury 
or gag orders.  But jurors do not enter the courtroom as blank slates; if the biasing 
information has already been acquired by an individual before he or she becomes a juror, 
these options are not likely to have any noticeable effect.  The court has dealt with this 
issue in a variety of ways.  One way is with judicial remedies (Kramer, Kerr, & Carroll, 
1990).  The court may delay a trial to allow the publicity to subside, which is referred to 
as a continuance.  The danger, however, is that the media will simply resume coverage 
once the trial begins.  Further, certain types of publicity, such as emotionally arousing 
information, may be less easily forgotten than more factual PTP (Honess, Charman, & 
Levi, 2003; Kramer, Kerr, & Carroll, 1990). 
Once the jury pool (known as the venire) has been drawn, prospective jurors are 
asked various questions, including questions about their knowledge of and beliefs about a 
case, which is called voir dire.  Often, voir dire is done in groups, in which the judge asks 
general questions, such as, “Has anyone heard anything about this case?” and jurors 
respond with yes or no (Hans & Dee, 1991).  When the pretrial publicity associated with 
a case is great, the court can elect to question each juror individually and even separately 
from the rest of the jury pool.  Obviously, this procedure is more time-consuming, and 
would not be part of the regular questioning procedure.  The court may also instruct 
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jurors to ignore any pretrial information they have obtained when deciding a case, 
referred to as a judicial admonition (Thompson & Fuqua, 1998).  Many researchers and 
theorists question whether jurors are able to ignore such information (Diamond & 
Vidmar, 2001). 
If PTP is so great that it is reasonable to assume an unbiased jury cannot be 
seated, the court may draw a jury pool from another community – referred to as a 
“change of venire” – and bring them to the jurisdiction in which the crime took place 
(Studebaker & Penrod, 2005).  Another option is to move the trial to another location and 
carry out jury selection there, which is called a “change of venue.”  This means that, 
rather than moving the jurors, the judge, attorneys, and defendant must go to the different 
jurisdiction instead.  Either of these options is expensive and, therefore, rarely used.  The 
judge may also be hesitant to move a trial because of strong community reactions to the 
crime and a desire to try to a case in the community (Moran & Cutler, 1991).  For 
example, Finkel (1995) discusses the Rodney King trial, which was moved to another 
venue, and the police officers accused of assaulting King were acquitted; this relocation 
led to riots and vocal critics, who believed that moving the trial to a predominantly White 
community had been a miscarriage of justice.  Well-known cases like this one can 
influence other judges’ willingness to grant change of venue motions because of fear of 
community reaction (Finkel, 1995). 
The research examining continuance, voir dire, and judicial admonitions have not 
always found strong conclusions, though Studebaker and Penrod (1997) argue that our 
lack of complete understanding of PTP effects may make it difficult to uncover remedies 
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that will actually have an effect.  If the remedies do not work, the final option is to 
overturn a verdict.  The court has only exercised this option a few times (e.g., Irvin v. 
Dowd, 1961; Rideau v. Louisiana, 1963; Shepherd v. Maxwell, 1966).  In such cases, the 
amount of PTP has been extreme and the information highly inflammatory.  Some 
research suggests, however, that PTP does not need to reach the level seen in these cases 
to be biasing to jurors. 
Legal psychologists have examined the issue of PTP from many angles.  Two of 
the most important aspects of this research are 1) how to determine whether a prospective 
juror has been biased so that he or she may be excused from service and 2) how to use 
remedies effectively so that, if any biased jurors were identified, the right to a fair trial by 
an impartial jury may be ensured.  The goal of this project is to examine these two issues, 
by comparing individuals receiving biasing information in PTP to individuals receiving 
control information, and by comparing levels of judicial admonishment.  In addition, the 
present research will measure and integrate participants’ attitudes toward certain pieces 
of legal information to determine if and how these attitudes affect verdicts and 
effectiveness of admonitions.  Attitudes have been examined before in the PTP research 
(e.g. Arbuthnot, Myers, & Leach, 2002; Butler, 2007; Chrzanowski, 2006; Constantini & 
King, 1980/1981; De Luca, 1979; Kovera, 2002), with often mixed results, but the 
present research will expand on prior attitude research by measuring the effect of specific 
attitudes instead of general attitude toward crime, which, according to theory on attitude-
behavior correspondence (Ajzen & Sexton, 1999; Ronis, Yates, & Kirscht, 1989), should 
have a stronger relationship to verdict preferences. 
6 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Before discussing the present research, it is necessary to examine what has been 
found in the past.   First, the findings of research on PTP will be summarized and 
discussed, including research that has examined the use of one or more remedies, along 
with commentary on the methodology utilized in these studies.  Next, research and theory 
on attitudes will be reviewed.  
Pretrial Publicity 
PTP became a topic of research in the 1960s, shortly after the American Bar 
Foundation (ABA) released recommendations for what information law enforcement and 
court personnel should not give to the press.  The most recent guidelines (ABA, 1991) 
included information on a confession or similar statement, results of tests, opinions on 
guilt, information on defendant’s character, and information on prior arrests or 
convictions.  A handful of researchers have performed content analyses of the media to 
determine whether these guidelines have been followed and what type of information is 
actually being included in PTP, as well as to provide estimates of how many stories a 
given defendant receives.  Often, such content analyses are performed as part of a change 
of venue motion (e.g. Moran & Cutler 1991, 1997; Studebaker, Robbenolt, Pathak-
Sharma, & Penrod, 2000) or as part of an experimental study using a certain trial (e.g., 
Chrzanowski, 2006), meaning these analyses examine only one case.  Other content 
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analyses have examined the media in general, and have found that PTP is predominantly 
pro-prosecution and the recommendations of the ABA are routinely violated (Imrich, 
Mullin, & Linz, 1995).  Further, certain defendants, such as racial minorities, may be the 
subject of more negative PTP (Dixon & Linz, 2002). 
Bruschke and Loges (1999) examined all federal first-degree murder trials in a 2-
year period and found that approximately 46% of the cases received no publicity.  The 
remaining cases varied in the amount of PTP received, ranging from cases covered in one 
article to one case that received 141 articles.  The more sensational the crime, the more 
publicity it will receive.  For instance, Studebaker, Robbennolt, Pathak-Sharma, and 
Penrod (2000) content-analyzed over 1500 articles for the Timothy McVeigh trial; these 
articles were randomly selected from specific venue locations, meaning that this number 
does not represent the entire population of articles on this case. 
Non-Experimental Studies of PTP Effects 
Obviously, PTP does not occur in all cases, but it does occur in a sizeable 
proportion of cases, and, because it is very likely to be negative toward the defendant, it 
is a cause for concern.  Various researchers have studied the effect of naturally occurring 
PTP on the tendency to prejudge guilt-innocence, as well as a variety of other variables, 
such as sentencing preference and the ability to be impartial.  Some were performed as 
part of a motion for a change of venue, while others were performed to examine a new 
methodology in performing public opinion surveys.  These studies provide information 
on how PTP affects verdict preferences pretrial. 
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Though these studies differ in how PTP exposure is operationalized, PTP 
exposure does appear to affect beliefs about guilt, especially pretrial.  Nietzel and 
Dillehay (1983) presented the results of 5 community surveys, four of which compared 
respondents in the trials’ current venues (where PTP exposure was high) to one or more 
alternative venues.  Results in general show that respondents from the venue counties, 
where PTP tends to be greater, were more likely to have heard about the cases, read 
stories about the cases, and believe the defendants were guilty than respondents from 
other counties.  Vidmar and Judson (1981) and Moran and Cutler (1991, 1997), on the 
other hand, operationalized PTP exposure by whether a respondent was aware of a case, 
and found that respondents who had heard about a case were more likely to believe the 
defendant was guilty. 
Other researchers have tested respondents’ knowledge of the case, and examined 
guilt based on specific pieces of content remembered (Chrzanowski, 2006), categorized 
participants by level of knowledge (Constantini & King, 1980/1981; Simon & 
Eimermann, 1971), or correlated number of correct responses with guilt (Arbuthnot, 
Myers, & Leach, 2002; Studebaker, Robbennolt, Penrod, Pathak-Sharma, Groscup, & 
Devenport, 2002).  Regardless of how knowledge was measured, it was found to relate to 
belief in guilt; respondents who were more knowledgeable were more likely to believe 
the defendant was guilty. 
These surveys show that respondents who are knowledgeable about the trial are 
more likely to prejudge, though there are some exceptions.  Brown, Duane, and Fraser 
(1997) found that respondents with increased exposure to O.J. Simpson through the 
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media were more likely to believe Simpson was innocent, though this was because 
participants with increased exposure tended to form a parasocial relationship, a 
psychological connection people may develop with celebrities, with Simpson.  
Obviously, when the defendant is a celebrity, PTP may have different effects on potential 
jurors and may even create sympathy for the defendant. 
Some studies have used naturally occurring PTP, and then presented participants 
with trial information.  Freedman and Burke (1996) measured knowledge of the case, and 
then gave participants a brief summary.  Because the case had not yet come to trial, the 
researchers created the trial summary based on similar cases.  Though knowledgeable 
participants believed, pretrial, that the defendant was guilty, this effect went away after 
reading the summary.  Participants were informed that this trial information was 
fabricated and that the researchers did not have inside information on the trial; the trial 
information was also very weak, yielding approximately a 31 percent conviction rate 
overall. 
Honess, Charman, and Levi (2003) also studied naturally occurring PTP in a fraud 
case in England.  Participants reported what they could remember about the case, and 
their responses were classified as being either emotional (such as information on the 
effect the crime had on the victims) or factual (such as the amount of money involved) 
PTP.  Over a period of days, participants viewed a six-hour video re-enactment and 
provided their thoughts and verdict preferences throughout.  At the end of the trial, 
participants rendered a final verdict and evaluated the evidence.  Results showed an effect 
for emotional PTP, but not for factual PTP; participants who had recalled emotional 
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information pretrial were more likely to render a guilty verdict.  In addition, 
participants’ reasoning about the trial was found to mediate the effect of PTP on verdict.  
The PTP had affected the way they considered the evidence throughout the trial, which in 
turn, influenced their verdict. 
In another examination of naturally occurring PTP, Chrzanowski (2006) 
conducted an internet study in which she measured the effect of naturally occurring PTP 
on pretrial, midtrial, and post-trial verdicts in an acquaintance rape trial and found an 
effect for PTP.  Participants completed a questionnaire of what they remembered from 
PTP, then over a period of months, completed guilt ratings and evaluations of various 
pieces of evidence after each trial summary.  Participants who reported viewing pro-
prosecution PTP, which was coded based on what information they recalled from the 
media, rated the defendants as significantly more guilty throughout the trial than 
participants who had recalled neutral or pro-defense PTP information.  Participants who 
had recalled pro-defense PTP, on the other hand, rated the defendant as significantly less 
guilty.  Pro-defense PTP, however, is far less common than pro-prosecution PTP. 
One study examined the effect of naturally occurring PTP by accident.  While 
studying the effect of eyewitness testimony in a trial summary, Greene and Loftus (1984) 
suddenly saw a drop in conviction rates.  On the debriefing questionnaires, many 
participants mentioned that they had acquitted the defendant because of a recent case in 
the media (the Titus case) in which a man had been released after it was established that 
the victim in his trial had been mistaken in identifying him as the perpetrator.  This study 
was one of the first to examine general PTP – media information on crime in general or 
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on a different trial that influences verdicts in the target trial.  In a second study, Greene 
and Loftus recruited a community sample, asking if they had heard about another case 
involving a mistaken eyewitness, and measured their verdict preference in the case from 
their first study.  Once again, participants who had heard about the case of mistaken 
identification were less likely to convict. 
While these results from non-experimental research on PTP are mixed, they 
generally show that PTP biases participants, even after exposure to trial information.  
Such research, however, does not allow control over other aspects that may affect trial 
outcome, such as facts of the case, characteristics of the parties involved, timing of the 
PTP, and contents of the PTP.  Such research also does not clearly show why trial 
information counteracts the effects of PTP in some cases, but not others.  Therefore, in 
addition to the study of naturally occurring PTP, many researchers have performed 
experiments in which they manipulate the presence of PTP and measure the effects on 
verdicts and guilt ratings. 
Experimental Studies of PTP Effects 
Though there are many contradictory findings in the experimental PTP literature, 
there are some factors that have been demonstrated to affect study outcome.  One 
commonly studied factor is the type of information presented in PTP.  The ABA 
guidelines included a variety of information that should not be published in PTP, and 
content analyses (Dixon & Linz, 2002; Grady, 1972; Imrich, Mullin, & Linz, 1995) have 
shown that PTP can include many difference pieces of information - from hearsay to 
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prior convictions to confession information.  Research suggests that the content of PTP 
may have an effect on guilt. 
Two of the most biasing pieces of information, a confession and prior convictions, 
are often ruled inadmissible in court; the former is ruled inadmissible if it was coerced, 
and the latter is generally not allowed in court except when the defendant testifies.  De 
Luca (1979) compared several news stories, to determine how different pieces of 
information affected perceptions of guilt.  Participants who read about a confession, 
either alone or in combination with information on prior arrest and/or failure of a lie 
detector test, were more likely to believe the defendant was guilty of embezzlement than 
control participants.  Unfortunately, he did not include conditions in which prior 
convictions or performance on a lie detector test were presented alone, so it is difficult to 
tell specifically what information biased participants. 
Padawer-Singer and Barton (1975) conducted two studies, with the cooperation of 
the Supreme Court of the State of New York, on the negative effects of confession and 
prior record information, using deliberating juries.  Participants were randomly selected 
from the court’s jury pools and were assigned to 12-person juries.  Half of the juries 
received a news story stating that the defendant had a prior record and had confessed to 
the crime.  Participants met in a courtroom, where they listened to a recording of a trial, 
then deliberated to a verdict.  The first experiment ended with many hung juries, but 
individual jurors who had received PTP were more likely to vote guilty.  In the second 
experiment, more time was given for deliberation, meaning there were fewer hung juries, 
especially among exposed jurors.  Juries receiving negative PTP were more likely to 
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convict.  Once again, because prior record and confession were always presented 
together, it cannot be ascertained whether one is more biasing than the other, or what 
effect each piece of information would have alone.  However, this study does support the 
contention that such information is biasing to juries.  Tans and Chaffee (1966) also 
compared different pieces of favorable or unfavorable information, and examined the 
effect confession alone or when combined with other information.  Once again, 
information on a confession increased perceptions of guilt, especially when this 
information was presented alone. 
Prior record alone is also believed to be very biasing to jurors.  Otto, Penrod, and 
Dexter (1994) examined prior record, along with other biasing pieces of information: 
negative statements on the defendant’s character, information on the defendant’s low 
status job, and strong or weak inadmissible statements from the defendant’s neighbor.  
Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of these pieces of information, 
rendered a pretrial verdict, viewed a videotaped trial, and completed a measure of verdict 
and perceptions of the defendant.  Character information and inadmissible statements 
were found to influence pretrial verdicts, which, in turn, influenced final verdicts.  
Character information and strong statements biased the participants toward guilt, while 
weak statements had the opposite effect.  In addition, prior record affected final verdict 
indirectly; knowledge of a prior record made participants more likely to view the 
defendant as a “typical criminal” which led to more guilty verdicts. 
Placement of the information did not have an effect.  Hvistendahl (1979) also 
studied prior arrest, as well as other negative information, examining whether placement 
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moderated the effect of PTP on verdict.  Participants were randomly assigned to 
receive control information, prior arrest, gang membership, or defendant race.  He found 
that prejudicial information presented in the last paragraph was just as biasing as 
prejudicial information presented in the lead paragraph, and participants who had 
received information on prior arrest or gang membership were more likely to believe the 
defendant was guilty than participants receiving control or race information. 
In addition, though not part of the ABA’s guidelines, some researchers have 
examined the effect of reports on evidence, such as witness information or physical 
evidence to be used in trial.  Even if the participants eventually hear the evidence in trial, 
such information presented in PTP can be one-sided.  Shaw and Skolnick (2004) 
compared PTP containing witness testimony information to PTP summarizing physical 
evidence, and found that participants were more likely to find the defendant guilty in the 
physical PTP condition.  This effect was only significant, however, after participants had 
deliberated.  Burke (2000) also examined reports on evidence.  Participants then viewed a 
trial and deliberated in groups of 4 to 7.  After deliberation, participants rendered 
individual verdicts.  Only participants receiving eyewitness information in PTP rendered 
any guilty verdicts; all other participants found the defendant not guilty. 
Another way content has been studied is by classifying PTP as emotional or 
factual in nature.  Kramer and Kerr (1989) compared participants receiving control 
information, factual information (prior convictions and inadmissible physical evidence), 
emotional information (a hit-and-run charge), or both factual and emotional information 
in PTP.  Participants receiving any biasing information were more likely to convict.  It 
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was argued, however, that emotional information may be more memorable and that 
emotional PTP may still have an effect on verdicts after a delay.   
To study this possibility, Kramer, Kerr, and Carroll (1990) performed an elaborate 
study using the same case and stimuli as Kramer and Kerr (1989).  Some participants saw 
the case immediately after seeing PTP, while others saw the case after a delay.  In 
addition, some participants were allowed to deliberate.  The majority of participants were 
jury-eligible community members, with a few student participants included only in 
sessions without enough participants to create complete juries.  They found that, while a 
delay reduced the number of guilty verdicts among participants receiving factual PTP, it 
had no effect on participants receiving emotional PTP, who were more likely to find the 
defendant guilty than participants not receiving emotional PTP.  They also found that 
PTP effects were stronger for jurors allowed to deliberate than for participants asked to 
decide the case alone. 
Another factor that may affect study outcome is type of media.  Many researchers 
use newspaper stimuli, but some research (e.g., Rollings & Blascovich, 1977) suggests 
that PTP viewed in other media, such as on TV, may have different effects.  Ogloff and 
Vidmar (1994) compared control participants to participants receiving newspaper only, 
video only, or both newspaper and video, to determine if media had an influence on study 
outcome.  Participants receiving any media were more likely to believe the defendant was 
guilty than control participants.  The media groups did not significantly differ, but the 
authors argued that the results showed a definite trend over all dependent variables, and 
that this trend was in the hypothesized direction: belief in guilt and preferred sentence 
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were highest in the video and newspaper condition, and lowest in the newspaper only 
condition. 
Deliberation has also been identified as a factor that can affect study outcomes 
(Bruschke & Loges, 2004).  A handful of studies, including a few of the studies discussed 
previously, included deliberation, with some finding that deliberation reduced the effect 
of PTP (e.g., Burke, 2000), and with others finding no effect (e.g., Padawer-Singer & 
Barton, 1975) or even an increased effect of PTP (e.g., Davis, 1986; Dexter, Cutler, & 
Moran, 1992; Kramer, Kerr, & Carroll, 1990; Ruva, 2006; Shaw & Skolnick, 2004).  
These mixed results have led some researchers to examine possible explanations.  One 
explanation for the mixed effects of deliberation is source-monitoring.  It has been argued 
that PTP has an influence on post-deliberation verdicts because jurors forget where the 
information came from, and believe the PTP information was actually presented in trial 
evidence.  Ruva, McEvoy, and Bryant (2007) compared participants receiving PTP or 
unrelated news stories who either deliberated or individually listed as many trial facts as 
they could remember.  Participants exposed to PTP were more likely to find the 
defendant guilty than participants who read unrelated stories; deliberating jurors were 
less likely to find the defendant guilty than non-deliberating jurors, but deliberation did 
not interact with PTP.  Even after deliberating, exposed jurors were more likely to vote 
guilty than non-exposed jurors.  Ruva et al. also found that after deliberation, exposed 
jurors were more likely to mistake PTP for trial evidence.  Non-deliberating jurors did 
not make such source-monitoring errors. 
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Another explanation is case strength.  Kerr, Niedermeier, and Kaplan (1999) 
compared jurors receiving negative PTP to jurors receiving positive PTP after reading 
either a moderate-strength case or a weak case.  They found that participants receiving 
negative PTP and those reading a moderate-strength case were more likely to find the 
defendant guilty, but found no interaction between PTP and case strength.  In addition, 
jurors who deliberated were less likely to find the defendant guilty than non-deliberating 
jurors in the weak case, but when reading the moderate case, deliberating jurors were 
more likely to find the defendant guilty.  Essentially, studies that use moderate-strength 
cases should be more likely to find increased PTP effects after deliberation than studies 
using weaker evidence or studies that do not allow deliberation. 
Strength of the evidence has been examined in other PTP studies, as well.  In fact, 
some researchers (e.g., Dexter, Cutler, & Moran, 1992; Fein, Morgan, Norton, & 
Sommers, 1997; Riedel, 1993; Ruva et al., 2007; Ruva & McEvoy, 2008) have noted that 
a moderate-strength case was specifically chosen for their research, because PTP is more 
likely to have an influence.  This is based on the liberation hypothesis (Kalven & Zeisel, 
1966), which states that jurors will decide a case based on the evidence in strong and 
weak cases, but will be more likely to use outside information when case strength is 
moderate.   
A recent field study (Devine, Buddenbaum, Houp, Studebaker, & Stolle, 2009) 
examined the liberation hypothesis in real cases.  The study was conducted using court 
cases from courts in Indiana.  Data on strength of the evidence and extraevidentiary 
variables (such as PTP) were gathered through questionnaires from judges and attorneys, 
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and final verdicts were measured with questionnaires from jurors.  The authors 
analyzed the moderating effect of strength of the evidence in two ways.  First, they 
correlated extraevidentiary variables with verdict while partialling out variance due to 
strength of the evidence.  Second, they divided cases into weak, moderate, and strong 
evidence, and separately conducted correlations between extraevidentiary variables and 
verdict at each level of evidence strength.  PTP still had a significant effect on verdict 
even after controlling for evidence strength, but when cases were classified as weak, 
moderate, or strong, PTP only had a significant effect on verdict for moderate cases. 
Methodological Issues with Studying PTP 
Several researchers (Bruschke & Loges, 2004; Steblay, Besirevic, Fulero, & 
Jimenz-Lorente, 1999; Wilson & Bornstein, 1998) have noted that the method used to 
study PTP effects may influence the outcome.  Though people tend to evaluate targets in 
terms of good-bad naturally, perhaps even automatically (Ajzen & Sexton, 1999), it 
appears that when someone is being asked to perform this process as a juror, the outcome 
may be different from a person who has been asked to do something else.  The role 
people are asked to play in a study can affect how they evaluate their target, the 
defendant (Freedman, Martin, & Mota, 1998).  For instance, in Frame’s (2001) study, 
participants told to evaluate the defendant were more likely to evaluate the defendant 
negatively than participants asked to read and evaluate the comprehensibility of the trial 
transcript.  It is unclear, however, whether the different outcome is because the 
participant employed a different process when being asked to serve as a juror versus 
being asked to evaluate the comprehensibility of the transcript, or whether being asked to 
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evaluate something else utilized cognitive resources that would have otherwise been 
used to evaluate the defendant.  In any case, the instructions given, whether serving as a 
cover story or simply to create a control condition, can have profound effects on the study 
outcome.   
A study by Simon (1966) also shows the effect of instructions.  Simon compared 
news stories written in different styles.  Participants received negative PTP written in a 
conservative style or a sensational, tabloid style.  Those who read the sensational article 
were more likely to believe the defendant was guilty than participants reading the 
conservative article.  The effect went away, however, after hearing the trial and being 
admonished by the judge to ignore PTP information.  Some (Lieberman & Arndt, 2000) 
question whether these findings are due to demand characteristics; participants were 
recruited for a study on the “problem of trial publicity” (p. 41).  In addition, all 
participants received the same information pretrial, so comparisons could not be made to 
participants who received no information; though trial information reduced guilty 
verdicts, it is possible that participants receiving PTP were still more likely to vote guilty 
than participants receiving no PTP. 
Lack of trial information can also explain differing results.  Public opinion 
surveys aimed at measuring the tendency to prejudge usually do not present information 
from the trial; this is understandable, because in many of these cases, the trial has not yet 
begun.  Some experimental studies, however, use PTP as their only stimulus, and even 
ask participants to take on the role of juror and decide the case based on the news articles 
they received.  Obviously, this would maximize the chances that participants base their 
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decisions on prejudicial information and may even cause them to “fill in the blanks” 
left by the lack of trial information with other information gleaned from the media and 
personal stereotypes in order to form a cohesive story (Finkel, 1995).  In addition, some 
studies use only brief summaries.  Kramer and Kerr (1989) found a difference between 
participants viewing a short trial and participants viewing a longer trial; conviction rates 
were higher in the short trial.  They did not, however, find a significant interaction 
between trial length and PTP exposure. 
Freedman, Martin, and Mota (1998) argue that procedure and method of 
measurement explain PTP effects.  In their first study, participants received negative or 
neutral PTP, viewed a video-taped trial, and then received either neutral instructions from 
the judge or an admonition to ignore PTP information.  The authors found no effect of 
PTP.  In their second study, participants followed the same procedure, except half of the 
participants gave an additional rating of their verdict preference prior to viewing the trial.  
The authors found that negative PTP led to higher guilt ratings posttrial only among those 
participants who gave their opinion pretrial. 
Source of the sample has also received criticism, with some questioning whether 
research based on student samples is generalizable to the courts.  While most of the 
studies discussed previously used student samples, Sue and colleagues have shown that 
these effects are also found in community samples.  Sue, Smith, and Gilbert (1974) 
compared student participants to participants recruited throughout the community.  All 
participants received a newspaper article on the case that mentioned a gun found in the 
defendant’s possession; in half of the articles, the gun was the murder weapon but was 
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inadmissible in court (due to an illegal search), and in the other half of the articles, the 
gun was not the murder weapon.  The researchers found no difference between students 
and community members.  Participants who were told the gun was the murder weapon 
were more likely to believe the defendant was guilty; this effect was stronger among 
female participants. 
Bornstein (1999) also examined sample source, in an analysis of all jury 
simulation studies published in Law and Human Behavior between 1977 and 1996.  He 
found that 65% of the studies used undergraduate samples and 55% used written trial 
stimuli, and that the proportion of studies using undergraduate samples is increasing over 
time.  His review of the literature and its findings, however, uncovered few differences 
between studies using written stimuli and those using more realistic trial presentations.  
Though Bornstein states that there is not much cause for concern over the validity of less 
realistic studies, he does warn that the court is often suspicious of such studies (a 
sentiment that has been echoed by others: Studebaker & Penrod, 1997; Studebaker, 
Robbennolt, Penrod, Pathak-Sharma, Groscup, & Devenport, 2002), and recommends 
that researchers performing simulation research using student samples and/or written 
stimuli follow these studies with replications that use more diverse samples and realistic 
stimuli to demonstrate the robustness of the findings. 
It should be noted, though, that there are a handful of field studies – studies that 
have examined PTP and trial outcomes in real cases.  Even these studies have found 
mixed results.  For example, Bruschke and Loges (1999, 2004) studied first-degree 
murder and robbery cases in the federal courts and found that PTP generally had no effect 
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on trial outcome.  Devine et al. (2009) on the other hand, found that PTP did have an 
effect on trial outcomes, even after controlling for strength of the evidence.  The effect 
was strongest, however, in cases of moderate strength.  There were key differences in 
how these researchers measured PTP; Brushke and Loges searched for defendant names 
in Lexis/Nexis and counted any article that mentioned the crime, defendant, victim, or (in 
some cases) the defendant’s gang, but did not measure whether the PTP was negative or 
what information it contained.  Devine et al., on the other hand, asked the judge on the 
case whether there had been “significant pretrial publicity” (p. 140) or if any jurors had 
been removed from the panel due to media exposure.  These studies, as well as the others 
discussed, should make it clear that the method through which a researcher studies PTP 
can have an effect on the outcome of the study, even outside of the lab. 
Meta-Analysis on PTP 
Recently, I completed a meta-analysis on the subject of PTP (Locatelli, Fulero, & 
Kluwe, 2011); many of the previously discussed effects, including the effects of 
remedies, were investigated.  Searches for published studies were conducted using online 
databases, the American Psychological-Law Society newsletter, manual inspection of 
several applied and forensic psychology journals, and reference lists.  Unpublished 
studies were solicited by contacting PTP researchers and with a post to the PSYCH-LAW 
list-serv.  The results of 99 studies provided 37 pretrial effect sizes and 68 posttrial effect 
sizes of negative PTP on guilt.  These two sets were meta-analyzed separately from each 
other, due to the fact that some studies measured PTP effects both pretrial and posttrial.  
In both cases, a random effects model was used; this model assumes that there is not a 
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single true effect size, but a distribution of possible effect sizes depending on 
characteristics of the study.   
Many moderators were examined, including source of the sample, crime of which 
defendant was accused, strength of the evidence, deliberation, trial presentation format, 
judicial admonition, judicial instructions, and voir dire.  Pretrial, no moderators were 
significant.  The grand mean effect size was r = 0.323, SE = 0.042, Z = 7.96, p < 0.001, 
with a 95% confidence interval of 0.245 to 0.397.  This interval is expected to contain the 
true grand mean of pretrial effect sizes 95% of the time.  In addition, because the 
assumption of a random effects model is that the grand mean is not representative of all 
studies on a topic, these analyses produced a 95% prediction interval of -0.223 to 0.893, 
which reflects the distribution of possible individual study effect sizes depending on the 
study’s characteristics.  As this prediction interval suggests, it is not unusual for a single 
study to find no effect or even a negative effect of PTP, due to the distribution of true 
effect sizes, though more studies should find a positive effect of PTP. 
Posttrial, several moderators were significant.  Strength of the evidence was found 
to affect study outcome, with studies using moderate strength cases finding the largest 
effect sizes.  Crime also had a significant impact; studies using sex offenses and non-
violent crimes tended to have smaller effect sizes, and studies using homicide cases 
tended to have larger effect sizes.  Finally, trial presentation format had a significant 
effect, with studies using more realistic trial media finding smaller effect sizes.  Source of 
the sample and deliberation had no significant effects on study outcome.  In addition, 
whether participants were asked about guilt pretrial, which Freedman, Martin, and Mota 
  
24
(1998) argue explains why studies find an effect of PTP, had no effect of study 
outcome when examined across all 68 studies.  The grand mean effect size was r = 0.163, 
SE = 0.023, Z = 7.14, p < 0.001, 95% CI = 0.118, 0.207, with a 95% prediction interval 
of -0.222 to 0.550.  Once again, it is not unusual for a study to find no effect or even a 
negative effect of PTP, due to the distribution of true effect sizes and the characteristics 
of a given study, but more studies should find positive effects. 
Essentially, PTP does have an effect on verdicts and guilt ratings, both pre- and 
posttrial, and many factors explain the variability in study findings.  One issue that could 
not be fully explored in meta-analysis was the effect of remedies.  There was a great deal 
of variation in combinations of remedies, and in some cases, only one study used a 
particular type of remedy or combination of remedies.  Some research suggests, however, 
that remedies can be effective in alleviating PTP effects.   
Using Remedies to Alleviate PTP 
Information that is not refuted in trial can bias individual verdicts (Burke, 2000).  
If information has been ruled inadmissible prior to seating a jury, such as in a pretrial 
hearing, the jury may not even hear that the information is not to be used.  A general 
judicial admonition may or may not be effective at discounting such information.  Many 
studies (e.g. Fein, McCloskey, & Tomlinson, 1997; Sue, Smith, & Caldwell, 1973; Sue, 
Smith, & Gilbert, 1974) suggest general admonitions are not effective. 
Admonitions specifically mentioning the forbidden information have not been 
very effective, either.  Lee, Krauss, & Lieberman (2005) studied strong judicial 
admonitions in the context of inadmissible hearsay evidence in a civil case.  Participants 
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received no admonition, a weak admonition that hearsay evidence is not admissible, or 
a strong admonition that jurors are prohibited from using such evidence.  The authors 
found no difference in verdicts, but also found that participants receiving the strong 
admonition were more confident in their verdicts.  Wolf and Montgomery (1977) found 
that stronger and more specific admonitions increased dependence on the inadmissible 
information, and also increased participants’ self-reported desire to use such information.  
Similarly, Bornstein, Whisenhunt, Nemeth, and Dunaway (2002, Study 2) examined 
whether a specific judicial admonition to ignore pretrial publicity would alleviate pretrial 
publicity effects in a civil trial.  They found a main effect for instruction.  Participants 
receiving instructions to ignore PTP were less likely to find the defendant liable, 
including participants who did not receive any PTP.  Unfortunately, instructions did not 
interact with PTP. 
Another method of admonishing the jury involves giving a reason to ignore the 
forbidden information.  Freedman, Martin, and Mota (1998, Study 1) examined a judicial 
admonition, which not only contained an instruction to ignore PTP, but also included the 
statement that PTP is at “risk of being unreliable” (p. 260).  They found that this 
admonition decreased guilt votes overall and, the authors note, even appeared to have a 
stronger effect on participants who had received negative PTP, though the interaction 
term was not significant. 
Kassin and Sommers (1997) also studied the effect of explanations for judicial 
admonitions, and found that some reasons may be more effective than others.  In trial, 
some participants heard a taped conversation, in which the defendant confessed to the 
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crime.  In one condition, the tape was ruled inadmissible because it had been obtained 
illegally.  In another, the tape was ruled inadmissible because it was of poor quality and 
difficult to hear.  When participants were told the tape was illegally obtained, they were 
more likely to use the evidence.  When they were told the tape was barely audible, they 
followed the admonition and decided the case similarly to the control participants. 
Many psychological theorists as well as legal personnel (e.g., Curtner & Kassier, 
2005) have offered reasons for why these remedies are ineffective, such as psychological 
reactance and ironic process theory (Lee, Krauss, & Lieberman, 2005), which will be 
discussed in detail later.  It is possible that the remedies do not work, and that courts 
should consider their “last-resort” remedies, such as change of venire and change of 
venue more often.  This has been recommended before (e.g., Fulero, 1987).  However, 
others suggest that studying remedies in experimental isolation does not actually 
demonstrate how these remedies work in real-life.  Bruschke & Loges (2004) discuss the 
cumulative remedies hypothesis, which states that single remedies that appear ineffective 
alone may be effective when combined with each other.  Not only could the effects of 
remedies be additive or even multiplicative, but remedies are rarely used in isolation in 
actual courtrooms; judges frequently utilize more than one remedy.  In addition, certain 
elements that are referred to as remedies by the psychology literature are often fixed parts 
of the trial: voir dire and deliberation, for instance. 
Studies utilizing multiple remedies are rarely performed, though they have been 
recommended by many.  Carroll, Kerr, Alfini, Weaver, MacCoun, and Feldman (1986) 
recommend that researchers perform a study using three groups: a control group who 
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views no PTP, a treatment group who views PTP, and a second treatment group who 
views PTP and is then subjected to a set of judicial remedies.  Another possibility is that 
certain remedies are more effective on some people, especially people with certain 
attitudes.  Specifically attitudes toward PTP information may affect participants’ 
inclination to use such information in their verdict decisions and may also influence the 
effectiveness of remedies. 
Legal Attitudes 
A handful of studies of PTP have examined participants’ attitudes.  In general, 
these studies use an attitude measure to categorize participants.  One way of categorizing 
individuals is as authoritarian or non-authoritarian (also known as egalitarian).  Sue, 
Smith, and Pedroza (1975) found that, although authoritarianism affected perceived 
strength of the prosecution’s case, there was no significant effect on verdict or sentence. 
Another way involves classifying individuals as either “due process” or “crime 
control.”  Arbuthnot, Myers, and Leach (2002) asked their participants three questions 
designed to measure crime control attitudes and three questions designed to measure due 
process attitudes.  The last three items were reverse-scored to create a composite score of 
what the authors called “pro-prosecution attitudes.”  These attitudes were not significant 
predictors of guilt ratings. 
Though PTP researchers have examined attitudes in their research, only a few 
have examined the interactions between specific attitudes and PTP.  Butler (2007) 
examined how PTP interacts with death qualification in a murder trial.  Prior research 
suggests that participants who are “death-qualified” tend to be qualitatively different 
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from and more conviction-prone than “Witt excludables” – jurors whose beliefs on the 
death penalty are so strong (either for or against) that they could not carry out their duties 
as a juror in a death penalty case.  Butler’s (2007) research suggests that death-qualified 
jurors may be more susceptible to PTP effects; death-qualified participants were more 
likely to attend to PTP and were more likely to remember information obtained from 
media sources.  This, in turn, made death-qualified participants more likely to believe the 
defendant was guilty.  Death-qualified participants were also more likely to believe the 
defendant would receive a fair trial, suggesting that they may also be more likely to state 
they could be impartial jurors than “excludable” participants. 
Chrzanowski (2006) also examined interactions between PTP and attitudes.  In 
her path analyses, she incorporated interactions between specific attitudes toward rape 
and PTP bias (the degree to which the information received/recalled was pro-prosecution 
or pro-defense), finding several significant effects on final verdicts.  She did not, 
however, examine the relationship between specific attitude and specific pieces of 
information from the PTP.  In addition, her results cannot be generalized to the effect of 
specific attitudes on cases other than rape.  Regardless, Chrzanowski’s approach is much 
different than the approach other researchers have taken to studying the effect of 
attitudes; most have combined scores on attitude measures to create an overall composite.  
Many argue that the category into which a person falls (due process or crime control, 
authoritarian or egalitarian, and so on) should affect verdict, but these categories are 
based on the scores a person receives and not necessarily on their feelings about 
individual pieces of information.  An individual may be “due process” overall, but if he 
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or she has an attitude that only guilty people run from the police, finding out that a 
defendant resisted arrest would bias him or her against that defendant, perhaps regardless 
of other attitudes.  This may explain some researchers’ null findings when examining 
attitudes. 
Theories Explaining or Predicting These Effects 
There are a variety of theories that explain why specific attitudes, and the strength 
of those attitudes, could affect verdict preferences, regardless of the remedies used in 
trial.  Though PTP researchers have examined attitudes in their research, few have 
integrated attitude theory into their research or used such theory to devise hypotheses.   
According to Ajzen and Sexton (1999), the expectancy-value model is the most 
accepted theory of how attitudes are formed.  This theory states that attitudes are a 
function of the strength of beliefs about the attitude object and the evaluation (good-bad, 
desirable-undesirable, and so on) of that belief.  Attitudes develop as more beliefs are 
formed and evaluated, which occurs as more information is acquired about the attitude 
object.  Though an individual would not have a pre-made attitude about the defendant 
before encountering the PTP, an individual would likely have attitudes about the behavior 
of defendants, based on knowledge of past cases, media portrayals of crimes, and 
stereotypes (Finkel, 1995).  Information provided in PTP should affect a person’s beliefs 
about a defendant and the likelihood of guilt, and the evaluation of these beliefs should be 
influenced by pre-existing beliefs, attitudes, and biases about such pieces of information.  
The stronger the attitude, the more quickly the attitude is activated in the relevant 
situation (Fazio, 2000).  For instance, if I discover that a defendant has confessed to a 
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crime, this would affect my belief about the defendant.  The amount of weight I ascribe 
to this belief, however, depends on my evaluation of this information.  If I believe that 
confessions occur for other reasons than guilt, such as coercion by the police or a desire 
to protect someone else, then the weight I ascribe to this piece of information in 
generating my overall attitude toward the defendant is low.  On the other hand, if I 
strongly believe that a person who confesses is guilty, this information would be 
activated more quickly when encountering the current defendant, receive more weight, 
and strongly affect my overall attitude toward the defendant. 
The question becomes whether this attitude toward the defendant in reference to 
his or her guilt affects behavior, which is, in this situation, selecting a verdict.  According 
to Ronis, Yates, and Kirscht (1989), a great deal of research has found a weak 
relationship between attitudes and behavior.  Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) argue, however, 
that such weak relationships are found when the attitude being measured is very general 
and the behavior, very specific.  When more specific attitudes are measured, they are 
more predictive of specific behavior. In addition, Ajzen and Sexton (1999) argue that 
strong attitudes are less likely to vary by situation, and are thus, more predictive of 
behavior than weak attitudes.  This means that, when specific attitudes toward PTP 
information are measured, they should relate to verdict preferences, particularly when the 
attitudes are strong. 
When PTP is an issue in a case, the judge will often try to reduce the biasing 
effects of PTP information by issuing an admonition to jurors to ignore any information 
obtained outside of the trial.  As has been discussed previously, research on judicial 
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admonition has found little support that this remedy reduces bias, at least when used in 
isolation.  Various researchers have offered explanations and theories for why the 
admonition is ineffective, including ironic processes (Lee, Krauss, & Lieberman, 2005), 
thought suppression (Studebaker & Penrod, 1997), and reactivity (Lee, Krauss, & 
Lieberman, 2005). 
According to Lee, Krauss, and Lieberman (2005), ironic process theory states that 
when people are told to ignore certain information, two types of mental processes are 
activated.  The first type, conscious processes, aims at reaching the desired mental state, 
by thinking about what the person has been told to think about, such as the evidence.  The 
second type, unconscious processes, monitors thoughts on the undesired mental state, by 
looking for thoughts on what the person has been asked to ignore, such as pretrial 
publicity.  In trying to not think about something, the person ends up thinking about it 
more.  This means that, when jurors are told to ignore certain information, they are 
motivated to oblige, but their efforts to follow the judge’s instructions backfire.  Another 
possibility, thought suppression, is similar to ironic processes.  According to Studebaker 
and Penrod (1997), this phenomenon occurs when a person actively tries to suppress a 
particular thought, causing the thought to become more prominent, especially if the 
information is emotionally arousing.  In both of these cases, the individual is trying to 
avoid thinking about something, but ironic processes are unconscious while thought 
suppression is conscious. 
Psychological reactance, on the other hand, occurs when a juror does not attempt 
to suppress a thought, but instead ignores the judge’s instructions.  When being told to 
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ignore certain information, the juror may react by believing his free will has been 
threatened (Lee, Krauss, & Lieberman, 2005), leading to arousal (Lieberman & Arndt, 
2000).  In order to reaffirm one’s sense of free will, and decrease this negative arousal, 
the juror purposely uses the discredited information.  It is difficult to determine which of 
these general processes is at work, because the juror may be unaware of how she is being 
affected by the judge’s instructions (Hammerl & Fulcher, 2005), making these processes 
difficult, if not impossible, to measure.  Wolf and Montgomery (1977), however, found 
that participants receiving a strong admonition reported greater desire to use such 
information than others, suggesting that psychological reactance was occurring.  This was 
only the case when the admonition was strong, as opposed to the standard admonition.  In 
addition, a more recent study (Jonas, 2007) found that trait reactance only influenced 
verdict and sentencing when the inadmissible information was emotional in nature. 
Regardless of which of these processes is occurring, they all lead to the same 
outcome – that participants will use discredited information.  In addition, psychological 
reactance research suggests that reactance is more likely to occur when the admonition is 
strong and when it specifically threatens the participant’s choice; it also suggests that 
reactance can be thought of as a personality trait (Jonas, 2007; Pavey & Sparks, 2009), 
rather than a universal process.  Some studies find some positive effects of admonition, 
however, meaning that there may be some individual differences operating to clarify why 
admonitions are effective for some people but not others.  One explanation that has 
received some attention is belief perseverance (Lieberman & Arndt, 2000).  This 
phenomenon occurs when an individual continues to use a piece of information to make a 
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decision, even though that information has been discounted.  Lieberman and Arndt 
(2000) argue that belief perseverance is not a good explanation for PTP, because it does 
not explain the backfire effect, which occurs when people exposed to a judicial 
admonition are more likely to use the discredited information.  The study on instructions 
by Freedman et al. (1998), however, suggests that jurors are not blindly using biasing 
information.  When participants were told a piece of evidence was inadmissible because 
it was illegally obtained, they still used it, but when a piece of evidence was considered 
inadmissible because it was of poor quality, participants were able to suppress that 
information.   
It is possible, however, that by not examining attitude toward the information in 
past research, that belief perseverance effects were missed.  Research suggests it is more 
likely to happen in people with strong attitudes (Anderson, 1995).  Belief perseverance 
may explain why certain individuals continue to use biasing information even though the 
judge has admonished them to ignore it.  In addition, it may be strong attitudes, not 
psychological reactance, that explain the backfire effect.  Therefore, if belief 
perseverance is operating, participants with strong attitudes about a piece of information 
and its probative value should be more likely to continue to use it after being admonished 
by the judge and may ascribe greater weight to this information than participants with 
weaker attitudes.  This is much different from the explanations discussed previously, 
because ironic process, thought suppression, and reactivity effects are related to the 
instructions as well as the biasing information, not an individual’s attitudes toward that 
information.  By also examining attitudes, then, a researcher can make a comparison 
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between these general processes that should affect people with strong and weak 
attitudes alike to processes like belief perseverance that should interact with attitude 
strength.  This allows a researcher to use theories to create and test competing hypotheses 
– something which, reviewers argue, is lacking in PTP research (Bruschke & Loges, 
2004). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
The study will examine three variables.  The first variable is participant attitudes 
on specific pieces of legal information: confession, prior record, and resisting arrest.  The 
way a participant feels about this specific information and its probative value should be 
more predictive of verdict preference when this information is included in PTP than 
general attitude toward crime.  The second variable is biasing information.  Participants 
will be randomly assigned to receive one of 3 pieces of biasing information – confession, 
prior record, and behavior during arrest – or to receive a control article with no biasing 
information.  Finally, the third variable is a judicial admonition manipulation.  
Participants will be randomly assigned to receive standard trial instructions, an 
admonition specifically mentioning PTP, or a specific admonition along with a statement 
meant to attack the credibility of the media information. 
The following attitude hypotheses will be tested.  First, attitudes are expected to 
interact with PTP information to influence verdict preference.  That is, an individual with 
a strong attitude toward a certain piece of information will be more likely to find the 
defendant guilty if PTP contains that piece of information.  Participants with weak 
attitudes toward the PTP information will not be influenced by negative PTP, and should 
show similar verdict preferences as participants receiving neutral PTP.  If this hypothesis 
is confirmed, the results should look like Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1. Expected Interaction Effect of PTP and Attitude. 
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Hypotheses dealing with the judicial admonitions will also be tested.  Based on 
prior research, it is expected that stronger, more specific judicial admonitions should have 
a stronger effect than more general admonitions, and should reduce guilty verdicts.  Of 
particular interest in this study, however, is how judicial admonitions interact with PTP 
information and prior attitudes.  Based on belief perseverance literature, it is expected 
that people with strong attitudes should be less affected by judicial admonitions when 
presented with biasing information; the expected results will look like Figures 2, 3, and 4 
below for Standard, Specific, and Strong Instructions, respectively.  Alternatively, if one 
of the other more general processes is operating, attitude will not interact with 
admonition among participants receiving biasing information. 
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Figure 2. Expected Interaction Effect of PTP and Attitude (Instructions = Standard). 
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Figure 3. Expected Interaction Effect of PTP and Attitude (Instructions = Specific). 
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Figure 4. Expected Interaction Effect of PTP and Attitude (Instructions = Strong). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
DESIGN AND ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE 
 
This study uses a quasi-experimental design.  There are two manipulated and 
randomly assigned variables – PTP and instructions – and one variable, attitude strength, 
as a participant variable.  PTP is considered the independent variable, and instructions 
and attitude strength are moderators.  To use the terminology established by Jaccard 
(2001), attitude is a first-order moderator, which is expected to influence the relationship 
between PTP, the independent variable, and the outcome variables, verdict and 
continuous guilt rating.  Instructions are second-order moderators, expected to interact 
with the first-order moderator, attitude strength, and change its effect on the relationships 
between PTP and outcomes. 
Because the present study uses both categorical and continuous independent 
variables, as well as interactions between and among those variables, multiple regression 
was used.  Interactions were tested using the techniques of Aiken and West (1991).  This 
means first-order terms were entered into the equation first, and then interactions were 
entered second, to determine if they explain significant variance after first-order terms are 
in the equation.  Some of the hypotheses can only be tested with three-way interactions; 
according to Aiken and West, to test three-way interactions, all first- and second-order 
terms must be included in the regression equation.  Because of this requirement, a large 
number of variables are required in both equations, many of which are not being used to 
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test a hypothesis.  In order to determine a priori which variables are believed to be 
significant, a table was created (see Table 1), stating all variables included in the 
regression model and which hypothesis, if any, that variable tests. 
Table 1. Variables and Interactions Used to Test Hypotheses. 
First Order Hypothesis 
Confession (Conf.) PTP PTP 
Prior Record (Priors) PTP PTP 
Resisting Arrest (Res.) PTP PTP 
Conf. Attitude  
Priors Attitude  
Res. Attitude  
Specific Admonition Admonition 
Strong Admonition Admonition 
Second Order Hypothesis 
Conf. PTP X Conf. Attitude Attitude by Information 
Priors PTP X Prior Attitude Attitude by Information 
Res. PTP X Res. Attitude Attitude by Information 
Conf. PTP X Specific Admonition Admonition x Information 
Priors PTP X Specific Admonition Admonition x Information 
Res. PTP X Specific Admonition Admonition x Information 
Conf. PTP X Strong Admonition Admonition x Information 
Priors PTP X Strong Admonition Admonition x Information 
Res. PTP X Strong Admonition Admonition x Information 
Conf. Attitude X Specific Admonition  
Priors Attitude X Specific Admonition  
Res. Attitude X Specific Admonition  
Conf. Attitude X Strong Admonition  
Priors Attitude X Strong Admonition  
Res. Attitude X Strong Admonition  
Third Order Hypothesis 
Conf. PTP X Conf. Attitude X Specific Admonition Belief Perseverance vs. Alternative 
Priors PTP X Prior Attitude X Specific Admonition Belief Perseverance vs. Alternative 
Res. PTP X Res. Attitude X Specific Admonition Belief Perseverance vs. Alternative 
Conf. PTP X Conf. Attitude X Strong Admonition Belief Perseverance vs. Alternative 
Priors PTP X Prior Attitude X Strong Admonition Belief Perseverance vs. Alternative 
Res. PTP X Res. Attitude X Strong Admonition Belief Perseverance vs. Alternative 
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In addition to including all first- and second-order terms in the equation, 
continuous predictor variables should be centered, by subtracting the variable mean.  This 
is to prevent issues with multicollinearity.  According to Aiken and West (1991), the 
regression equation including a three-way interaction should be: 
Y = b1X + b2Z + b3W + b4XZ + b5XW + b6ZW + b7XZW + b0 
If b7 is significant, there is a three-way interaction.  In this case, the interaction 
would be probed as follows.  Aiken and West recommend rearranging the equation to 
show the regression of Y on X, which is accomplished by factoring X out of the equation: 
Y = (b1 + b4Z + b5W + b7ZW)X + (b2Z + b3W + b6ZW + b0) 
The first expression is the simple slope of X and the second expression is the Y-
intercept.  Then, X should be plotted at all possible combinations of ZH, ZL, WH, and 
WL, where H refers to a value one standard deviation above the variable mean and L 
refers to a value one standard deviation below the variable mean, or, if either Z or W is a 
dichotomous variable, L refers to the 0 category and H to the 1 category.  This will 
produce 2 graphs (WL and WH), each with two regression lines (ZL and ZH). 
The researcher should then test the simple slopes, to determine if the slope of the 
regression of Y on X is significantly different from 0 at a given value of Z and W.  The 
slope is tested by calculating the first expression in the equation above at the selected 
values of Z and W, then dividing the resulting slope by its standard error, computed as: 
sb = [s11 + Z
2s44 + W
2s55 + Z
2W2s77 + 2Zs14 + 2Ws15 + 2ZWs17 + 2ZWs45 + 2ZW
2s47 + 
2W2Zs57]
½ 
  
42
where snn refers to the value in row n, column n of the regression variance-covariance 
matrix. 
If the higher-order term is not significant, Aiken and West (1991) give 
recommendations on how to proceed.  Keeping the terms in the equation will not 
substantially bias the estimates of regression coefficients for lower order terms, but will 
influence the power to test the significance of lower-order regression coefficients.  
Therefore, the researcher should make a decision about whether these terms should be 
kept in the equation or whether they should be dropped.  If there is a strong theoretical 
basis for an interaction, the terms should be kept in the equation.  Otherwise, the 
researcher should use a step-down procedure, where the higher-order terms are dropped, 
and the regression analyses re-performed.   
There is some theoretical basis for the three-way interactions being significant, 
but these analyses are still somewhat exploratory in nature.  In the event the three-way 
interactions are not significant, these terms, as well as all unnecessary two-way 
interactions (terms not being used to test a hypothesis), should be dropped.  This will lend 
more power to the remaining tests and will also produce a more parsimonious model.  
Full and reduced models can also be compared: 
F (m, n – k – 1) =    (R2in – R2out) / (m) 
(1 – R2in) / (n – k – 1) 
where R2in  is the total variance explained in the full model,  R2out is the total variance 
explained in the reduced model, m is the number of terms being tested (in “in” but not 
“out”) and k is the total number of predictors in the full model.  If F is significant, then 
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the two models differ in the amount of variance explained.  A non-significant F means 
the two models do not differ and the simpler model should be adopted. 
Power Analysis 
Many of the studies performed on PTP have used small sample sizes, and/or have 
involved a large number of experimental conditions.  In fact, some of the studies finding 
null effects used few participants.  It was common to see factorial studies with only 20 
participants, or fewer, in each condition; this suggests that many researchers were using 
general rules on sample size, as opposed to power analysis.  When studying a 
phenomenon with a small to moderate effect size, like PTP, this number may not be 
sufficient.  No study reviewed made any mention of a priori power analysis, even though 
some researchers have tried to convince others of the importance of examining statistical 
power (e.g., Cohen, 1992). Obviously, a nonsignificant result does not necessarily mean 
power was low (Hoenig & Heisey, 2001), but analyzing power before beginning an 
experiment will maximize the chances that one will find a significant result, if such an 
effect exists.   
For multiple regression, power is computed using R2 and its effect size, f 2, which 
is computed as R2 divided by 1 – R2 (Cohen, 1988).  More specifically, because the 
present study is testing interactions, the effect size of interest is the change in R2 after 
controlling for a set of variables.  This first set of variables will be referred to as the 
“control” variables, while the additional set will be referred to as the “treatment” 
variables. 
  
44
Power analysis was performed using PASS 2008.  The current study uses 8 
control variables, with an additional 21 treatment variables, though it is important to 
mention that only 15 of these treatment variables are being used to test hypotheses; the 
additional variables are entered in the equation because they are necessary to test a three-
way interaction in multiple regression (Aiken & West, 1991) and are not expected to be 
significant.  Based on results from a meta-analysis, the control variables are expected to 
produce an R2 of approximately 0.1681, which was entered in the power analysis as 0.16 
to provide a more conservative estimate.  If each of the treatment variables explains less 
than 0.01 of the variance in Y (R2 = 0.06, a small effect size, Cohen, 1988), a sample of 
352 would be needed.  This is probably an overly conservative estimate, but this number 
would also provide some padding to account for any missingness or attrition in the 
dataset.  A sample size of 310 was selected as the minimum sample size needed (based 
on power analysis with treatment R2 = 0.08), and 352 was selected as the final sample 
size to account for potential missingness. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PILOT TESTING 
In the recent meta-analysis (Locatelli, Fulero, & Kluwe, 2011), it was found that 
PTP studies most frequently use either a homicide case (29 studies, or 42.9%) or a sexual 
assault case (9 studies or 13.2%).  In order to generalize PTP findings to actual cases, it is 
important to conduct studies using different crimes.  Therefore, the current study utilized 
an assault trial.  Pilot testing was conducted in order to find a case with a 50% conviction 
rate; PTP effects are strongest in moderate cases (Locatelli, Fulero, & Kluwe, 2011).   
Further, when this project was originally proposed, an additional variable of 
witness characteristics was included (see Appendix A for a brief review of the literature 
on witness characteristic effects).  It was expected that a crime committed against an 
elderly woman would elicit more negative affect than the same crime committed against 
a middle-aged man.  As part of pilot testing, this hypothesis was tested. 
Finally, it was originally planned that this project would be conducted online.  
Though other PTP studies have been conducted via the internet (e.g., Chrzanowski, 2006; 
Studebaker et al., 2002), no studies have been performed comparing results obtained via 
the internet to those obtained in the lab.  Therefore, half of participants completed the 
study through an online survey, and the other completed the study in the lab.  It was 
determined a priori that if any differences were found between lab and online results, the 
main study would be conducted in the lab. 
  
46
Pilot 1 Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 259 undergraduates from the Loyola University Introductory 
Psychology participant pool.  About 59 percent of the participants were women.  
Seventeen participants did not provide a verdict, and were dropped from analysis.  Of the 
remaining 242 participants, 121 completed the study in person and 121 completed the 
study as an online survey. 
Materials 
Trial transcripts. All transcripts were based on the case of Brunner v. 
Mississippi (2007).  This case involved an assault on an elderly woman by a former 
employee of the woman’s husband.  In order to find a case with a conviction rate of 50%, 
six transcripts of the same trial were created, each with a different combination of the 
following evidence: 
Favoring conviction 
 First neighbor, who reports seeing the defendant’s car in the area before 
assault 
 Second neighbor, who reports seeing the defendant’s car in front of the 
victim’s home 
 Victim’s identification of defendant 
 Case recovered from defendant’s home (which was stolen from victim’s 
home) 
 Disgruntled employee argument (defendant was former employee of victim’s 
brother, and threatened the victim’s brother when he was fired) 
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Favoring acquittal 
 Alibi 
 Poor ID by victim (not wearing glasses at the time of the attack and the fact 
that the brother mentioned the defendant as the perpetrator before the victim 
gave identification) 
 Poor ID by second neighbor (unsure if make of the car matches defendant’s 
car) 
 Explanation for recovered case 
In addition, for each combination of evidence, two copies of each version were 
created.  One named the victim as Joseph Washington, a 45-year-old man, and the other 
stated the victim was Janice Washington, a 70-year-old woman.  The names and genders 
of all witnesses were kept the same in all versions of the trial.  In order to keep all aspects 
of the trial constant, the defendant was made the former employee of the victim’s brother 
(rather than the victim’s spouse as in the original case), who was living with the victim at 
the time of the attack due to renovations on his home.   
Posttest. Following the trial transcript, participants completed a posttest.  First, 
participants were asked to render a verdict, using the options “guilty” or “not guilty.”  
After that, participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS: 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). This scale contains 20 items, 10 of which are negative 
emotions such as “distressed” or “ashamed”, and 10 or which are positive emotions such 
as “enthusiastic” or “proud.”  
Participants were asked to rate the degree to which the trial made them experience 
each emotion on a scale of 1 (“Very slightly or not at all”) to 5 (“Extremely”).  
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Procedure 
Participants completing the study online accessed an Opinio survey.  The first 
screen contained a consent script (see Appendix B).  Participants were then taken to one 
of 12 trial transcripts.  Each major section of the trial (opening statements, witness 
testimony, closing statements, jury instructions) was on its own page.  Participants 
completed the posttest, and were then taken to a debriefing screen (see Appendix C).   
Participants completing the study in person were greeted by the experimenter; 
they then received the same consent script as the online survey.  If they consented to be in 
the study, they approached the experimenter to obtain an envelope containing one of 12 
trial transcripts followed by the post-test.  Each participant was allowed to proceed 
through the packet at his or her own pace.  After completing the measure, participants 
returned their packet to the experimenter and were debriefed in the same manner as 
online participants.   
Pilot 1 Results 
All pilot study analyses were conducted using SPSS Version 16.  
Verdicts 
Percentage of guilty verdicts was computed by version, victim characteristics, and 
study location (lab or online).  Though certain case versions did reach the needed 50% 
conviction rate in some instances, there was a great deal of variation in conviction rates; 
victim characteristics and study location appeared to influence conviction rate.  The 
percentages are displayed in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2. Conviction Rates by Trial Version, Victim, and Study Location. 
Version Victim Online Lab 
1 Middle-aged man 30.00% 8.33% 
1 Elderly woman 20.00% 20.00% 
2 Middle-aged man 20.00% 60.00% 
2 Elderly woman 0.00% 18.18% 
3 Middle-aged man 27.27% 41.67% 
3 Elderly woman 20.00% 30.00% 
4 Middle-aged man 50.00% 25.00% 
4 Elderly woman 20.00% 36.36% 
5 Middle-aged man 20.00% 50.00% 
5 Elderly woman 80.00% 10.00% 
6 Middle-aged man 20.00% 20.00% 
6 Elderly woman 40.00% 14.29% 
Victim characteristics were coded as 0 (middle-aged man) and 1 (elderly woman); 
study location was also coded as 0 (online) and 1 (lab).  Interaction terms were created 
with the three variables: version x victim, version x location, victim x location, and 
version x victim x location.  A logistic regression was performed, using all variables and 
interactions; version and any interaction using version was entered into the logistic 
regression as a categorical variable1.   
The abbreviated results of the logistic regression can be found in Table 3 below 
(complete results for all variables, including dummy variables, can be found in Appendix 
D).  The overall model was significant, χ2 (df = 23) = 37.979, p = 0.026, McFadden’s R2 
= 0.151, and correctly classified 74.8% of participants.  Though none of the individual 
variables reached conventional levels of significance, the overall test of the three-way 
interaction term was significant, Wald (df = 5) = 11.90, p = 0.036. 
                                                 
1 When a logistic regression predictor is entered as “categorical,” SPSS creates a series of dummy codes for 
analysis.  This means that for a variable with k categories, the number of dummy variables, and 
corresponding beta coefficients, is k – 1. 
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Table 3. Overall Effects of Location, Version, and Victim on Verdicts. 
Predictor B SE Wald 
Location 0.000 1.118 0.000 
Overall Version   3.178 
Victim 0.981 1.021 0.924 
Overall Location X Version   7.520 
Overall Victim X Version   9.169 
Victim X Location -1.386 1.683 0.678 
Overall Victim X Location X Version   11.896* 
Constant -1.386 0.791 3.075+ 
Notes. +, p < 0.10, * p < 0.05 
Emotional Reactions 
The 10 negative items were combined to create a single negative composite.  In 
addition, the 10 positive items were combined to create a positive composite.  If the 
victim gender is having the desired effect, there should be an increase in negative 
emotion, meaning a significant difference between victim conditions on the negative 
composite.  Because positive emotion is considered to be independent of negative 
emotion (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), and participants in either condition should 
experience little to no positive emotion, there should be no difference on the positive 
composite.   
A 2 (victim) x 6 (version) x 2 (location) ANOVA was performed for the negative 
affect composite.  There was a significant effect of victim, F (1,218) = 8.801, p = 0.003.  
Participants reported experiencing more negative affect when the victim was an elderly 
woman (M = 16.3, SD = 5.48) than when the victim was a middle-aged man (M = 14.3, 
SD = 4.4).  In addition, there was a significant interaction between location and version, 
F (5,218) = 2.265, p = 0.049.   Additional simple effects testing revealed that for 
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participants completing the study online, there were no differences in reported negative 
affect by version, F (5,115) = 1.056, p = 0.389.  For participants completing the study in 
the lab, there was a significant effect of version, F (5, 115) = 2.879, p = 0.017; 
participants receiving version 1 (M = 13.0, SD = 3.295) experienced significantly less 
negative affect than participants receiving version 4 (M = 18.11, SD = 6.54).  No other 
differences were significant. 
The same 2 x 6 x 2 ANOVA was performed using the positive affect composite.  
There was a significant main effect of version, F (5,218) = 2.291, p = 0.047; post-hoc 
tests revealed that the only significant difference was between version 4 and version 5.  
No other effects were significant. 
Pilot 1 Discussion 
The method in which one completed the study had an influence on study results.  
Specifically, method interacted with victim and the facts of the case to influence whether 
a participant chose to convict.  It is unclear as to the reason for these effects.  There are a 
variety of possible explanations for the differences, but none that can be tested with the 
present data.  As one can see from the conviction rates in Table 1 above, in some cases, 
online participants were more likely to convict, but in other cases, they were less likely to 
convict.  Without further research, it is difficult to infer why case information was viewed 
so differently online versus in the lab.  It is possible that these differences were a product 
of this specific case or even the sample selected.  It may be that participants who choose 
to complete a study online are qualitatively different from participants who choose to 
complete a study in the lab. 
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Whatever the reason for the differences, however, there were differences, 
which could mean that jury research performed online may find different results in the 
lab.  Because lab settings are more similar to (though arguably still quite different from) 
actual jury trials than online settings, one could conclude that lab studies will provide 
more generalizable results.  At the very least, these differences suggest that there are 
differences for this specific case tested with this specific sample.  Therefore, since the 
next phase of this project will use the same case and sample source, additional pilot 
testing and the project itself will be performed in the lab. 
Because a case of moderate strength was not found, additional pilot testing was 
necessary.  Using the results of the first pilot test, version 4 was selected for additional 
work; this is because version 4 had the most consistent conviction rate across the two 
victims.  Certain aspects of this case were strengthened.  The victim’s identification of 
the attacker was strengthened.  In previous versions, the victim contacted his/her brother 
after the attack, and the brother asked if the attacker had been the defendant; instead, the 
victim clearly identified the defendant to his/her brother first.  The second neighbor’s 
identification was also strengthened. 
Pilot 2 Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 24 undergraduates from the Loyola University Introductory 
Psychology participant pool.  About 54 percent were women.  All participants completed 
the study in the lab. 
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Materials 
Trial transcript. All participants received the strengthened version 4 transcript.  
In one half of the transcripts, the victim was the middle-aged man; in the other half, the 
victim was the elderly woman. 
Posttest. The same posttests were used. 
Procedure 
Participants followed the same procedure as lab participants in Pilot 1.  Upon 
arriving at the lab, participants were randomly assigned to receive the middle-aged man 
version of the transcript, or the elderly woman version of the transcript. 
Pilot 2 Results 
 All analyses were conducted using SPSS Version 16. 
Verdicts 
Percentages of guilty verdicts were computed for both victim conditions.  When 
the victim was a middle-aged man, 41.7% of participants convicted; when the victim was 
an elderly woman, 58.3% of participants convicted.  Both of these cases would be 
considered of moderate strength. 
Emotional Reactions 
Once again, two composites were created, one negative and one positive.  
Differences were tested with two independent sample t-tests.  No significant differences 
were found for either composite, tnegative (22) = -0.785, p = 0.456 and tpositive (22) = -1.497, 
p = 0.149.  Means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 4 below. 
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Table 4. Means (and Standard Deviations) of Affect by Condition. 
Victim Negative Affect Positive Affect 
Elderly woman 17.75 (6.384) 26.42 (4.699) 
Middle-aged man 19.75 (6.538) 30.08 (7.064) 
Pilot 2 Discussion 
By strengthening certain aspects of the case, two moderate versions of the trial 
were found.  Unfortunately, this version yielded no significant difference between victim 
conditions on reported negative affect.  Because it was expected that the effect of victim 
on conviction in the actual study would be mediated by negative affect, further pilot 
testing would be necessary to find a suitable combination of evidence.  It was decided 
that for the present project, the victim variable would be dropped from the study.  Future 
research should examine the present variables and relationships with different victims 
and different cases. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
METHODS 
Participants 
Participants were 358 Loyola students, obtained through the Introductory 
Psychology participant pool.  They were recruited for a study on decision making about 
court cases.  Participants were predominantly freshmen, women, and Caucasian; only 2 
percent had ever served on a jury before.  See Table 5 below for complete information 
about the sample. 
Table 5. Sample Demographic Information. 
Variable M (SD) Range 
Age  19.1 (1.72) 18 – 38
Variable Frequency Percent 
Gender Male 108 30.2% 
 Female 249 69.6% 
 Missing 1 0.3% 
Race / Ethnicity Caucasian 245 68.4% 
 Hispanic/Latino 43 12.0% 
 Asian-American 35 9.8% 
 African-American/Black 13 3.6% 
 Other 18 5.0% 
 Prefer Not to Answer 4 1.1% 
Year in School Freshman 198 55.3% 
 Sophomore 107 29.9% 
 Junior 26 7.3% 
 Senior 27 7.5% 
Prior Jury Experience No 347 96.9% 
 Yes 7 2.0% 
 Missing 4 1.1% 
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Materials 
News Article 
A news article was written about the case; this article was based on similar crime 
news articles (see Appendix E).  Four versions of the article were created.  All versions 
stated that an arrest had been made in a recent assault on Joseph Washington, and gave 
some background on the crime.  The article then named the defendant, and gave some 
information on his upcoming court appearances.  The neutral version did not contain any 
additional information; this version was received by 83 participants.  The three PTP 
versions contained an additional line, between the statement about arrest and information 
on court appearances.  This line said “According to a police source,” followed by one of 
three pieces of biasing information: 1) “the suspect has confessed to the crime” (received 
by 92 participants), 2) “the suspect did not cooperate during arrest” (received by 88 
participants), and 3) “the suspect has been convicted of a similar crime in the past” 
(received by 95 participants). 
Questionnaire 
A voir dire questionnaire was also created (see Appendix F).  This questionnaire 
first gathered basic demographic information: age, gender, race, and whether the 
participant has served on a jury before.  Next, the questionnaire contained 34 attitude 
questions, which were drawn from the Legal Attitudes of Prospective Jurors scale 
(Kravitz, Culter, & Brock, 1993) and General Attitudes Toward the Legal System scale 
(Schiffhauer & Wrightsman, 1995, both reprinted in Wrightsman, Batson, & Edkins, 
2004).  Thirty-two of the questions were received by all participants.  The remaining two 
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questions varied.  Participants who received biasing information in their news article 
received two attitude questions that dealt with the specific information they received; 
those receiving confession information received two confession questions, those 
receiving prior conviction information received two prior record questions, and those 
receiving information that the suspect did not cooperate received two questions on 
resisting arrest.  Participants in the neutral group were randomly assigned to receive one 
of these three question pairs. 
Trial Transcript 
All participants received the trial transcript from Pilot 2, with the middle-aged 
man as the victim (see Appendix G). 
Jury Instructions 
Jury instructions were included at the end of the trial transcript (see Appendix H).  
Participants received one of three instructions; 120 received standard instructions.  One 
hundred twenty-two received standard instructions that also warned jurors not to use 
information from the media (specific instructions).  Finally, 116 participants received the 
specific instructions with the additional caution that media information can be inaccurate 
(strong instructions). 
Posttest 
Finally, a two-question posttest was used to obtain participant verdicts, with the 
choices being guilty and not guilty, as well as a rating of guilt, ranging from 1 – 
definitely not guilty to 7 – definitely guilty (see Appendix I). 
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Procedure 
The study was conducted in the lab.  Participants were greeted by the 
experimenter, and received the consent script (see Appendix J).  Those who agreed to 
participate were given a packet containing all necessary materials.  Participants were 
allowed to proceed through the packet at their own pace. 
Participants first received a news article, which they were told is to introduce 
them to the case.  After reading the article, the participant completed the questionnaire, 
which they were told is common procedure for potential jurors.  Participants next read the 
abbreviated trial transcript about an assault on a middle-aged man followed by standard, 
specific, or strong instructions.  Participants then selected a verdict and rated defendant 
guilt.  After completing the materials, they returned the materials to the experimenter and 
were debriefed (see Appendix K). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RESULTS 
All data were analyzed using R version 2.12.1 (R Development Core Team, 
2010); in addition, the QuantPsyc (Fletcher, 2010) and psych (Revelle, 2010) R libraries 
were used.  Six participants were dropped from analysis because they were missing one 
or both of the key attitude items that corresponded to PTP condition (confession, resisting 
arrest or prior record), leaving 353 participants.  Of these participants, 121 responded to 
confession attitude items (n = 92 receiving confession PTP, n = 29 receiving neutral 
PTP), 115 responded to resisting arrest items (n = 87 receiving resistance PTP, n = 28 
receiving neutral PTP), and 117 responded to prior record items (n = 92 receiving prior 
record PTP, n = 25 receiving neutral PTP). 
The two confession attitude items were averaged together to create a confession 
composite; a resisting arrest composite and prior record composite were created in the 
same way.  To prepare variables for analysis, attitude composites were centered by 
subtracting the mean, dummy variables were created for PTP and instructions, and 
interaction terms were created by multiplying variables together, in accordance with the 
recommendations of Aiken and West (1991).  Means and standard deviations were 
performed on all variables under study (see Table 6 below).  Additionally, correlations 
between predictor variables and the outcomes were performed (see Table 7 below).
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Table 6. Means and Standard Deviations of Variables and Interaction Terms. 
Variable n Mean SD 
Attitude Items 
Confession Attitude Item 1 121 2.88 1.06 
Confession Attitude Item 2 121 2.42 0.96 
Overall Confession Attitude 121 2.65 0.77 
Overall Confession Attitude (Centered) 121 0.00 0.77 
  
Resisting Arrest Attitude Item 1 115 2.25 1.07 
Resisting Arrest Attitude Item 2 115 2.63 1.02 
Overall Resisting Arrest Attitude 115 2.44 0.88 
Overall Resisting Arrest Attitude (Centered) 115 0.00 0.88 
  
Prior Record Attitude Item 1 117 3.49 1.09 
Prior Record Attitude Item 2 117 3.27 0.93 
Overall Prior Record Attitude 117 3.38 0.77 
Overall Prior Record Attitude (Centered) 117 0.00 0.77 
  
Interaction Terms 
Confession Attitude x PTP 121 -0.02 0.67 
Confession Attitude x Specific Instructions 121 -0.03 0.46 
Confession Attitude x Strong Instructions 121 -0.05 0.39 
Confession Attitude x PTP x Specific Instructions 121 -0.05 0.41 
Confession Attitude x PTP x Strong Instructions 121 -0.04 0.33 
  
Resisting Arrest Attitude x PTP 115 -0.03 0.78 
Resisting Arrest Attitude x Specific Instructions 115 0.05 0.51 
Resisting Arrest Attitude x Strong Instructions 115 -0.04 0.40 
Resisting Arrest Attitude x PTP x Specific Instructions 115 0.01 0.42 
Resisting Arrest Attitude x PTP x Strong Instructions 115 -0.03 0.33 
  
Prior Record Attitude x PTP 117 0.00 0.67 
Prior Record Attitude x Specific Instructions 117 0.02 0.42 
Prior Record Attitude x Strong Instructions 117 0.03 0.48 
Prior Record Attitude x PTP x Specific Instructions 117 0.04 0.34 
Prior Record Attitude x PTP x Strong Instructions 117 0.01 0.43 
  
Dependent Variables 
Verdict 353 0.47 0.50 
Guilt 353 4.81 1.20 
Notes. Interaction terms use centered attitude composite variables. 
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Table 7. Correlations between Predictors and Outcome Variables 
Variable Verdict Guilt Rating 
PTP   
Confession 0.04 0.10+ 
Resisting Arrest -0.06 -0.01 
Prior Record 0.03 0.03 
Instructions   
Specific (vs. Standard) 0.00 -0.06 
Strong (vs. Standard) 0.04 0.09+ 
Attitude   
Confession 0.12 0.01 
Resisting Arrest 0.15 0.17+ 
Prior Record 0.34** 0.32** 
PTP X Instruction   
Confession x Specific 0.03 0.00 
Confession x Strong 0.08 0.18* 
Resist x Specific 0.06 0.02 
Resist x Strong -0.09+ 0.01 
Prior x Specific -0.01 0.00 
Prior x Strong 0.03 0.01 
Attitude x PTP   
Confession 0.10 0.05 
Resisting Arrest 0.12 0.15+ 
Prior 0.39** 0.39** 
Attitude x Instruction   
Confession x Specific 0.21* 0.05 
Confession x Strong -0.08 -0.06 
Resist x Specific 0.01 -0.01 
Resist x Strong 0.16+ 0.19* 
Prior x Specific 0.22* 0.22* 
Prior x Strong 0.23* 0.23* 
PTP x Instructions x Attitude   
Confession x Specific 0.15 0.06 
Confession x Strong -0.04 -0.06 
Resist x Specific 0.05 0.07 
Resist x Strong 0.06 0.07 
Prior x Specific 0.18+ 0.23* 
Prior x Strong 0.25* 0.24* 
Dependent Variables   
Verdict  0.61** 
Notes. Attitude variables are centered composites; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
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Regression Analyses on Guilt 
Guilt data were analyzed with linear multiple regressions.  One regression was 
performed to compare effects of the four types of PTP (confession, resisting arrest, prior 
record, and neutral) and three types of instructions (standard, specific, and strong) on 
guilt ratings.  This model included three dummy variables to reflect PTP (with neutral 
PTP as the comparison group) and two dummy variables to reflect instructions (with 
standard instructions as the comparison group).  The overall model was marginally 
significant, R2 = 0.03, F (5,347) = 1.89, p = 0.10 (see Table 8 for regression coefficients).  
One predictor was significant; participants receiving confession PTP assigned higher 
guilt ratings than participants receiving neutral PTP (β = 0.16, t = 2.44, p = 0.02).  
Additionally, the effect of prior record PTP was marginally significant; participants 
receiving prior record PTP assigned higher guilt ratings than participants receiving 
neutral PTP (β = 0.11, t = 1.69, p = 0.09). 
Table 8. Predicting Guilt Rating with Type of PTP and Jury Instructions. 
Predictor B SE β t 
Constant 4.52 0.16  28.56** 
Confession PTP 0.44 0.18 0.16 2.44* 
Resisting Arrest PTP 0.23 0.18 0.08 1.22 
Prior Record PTP 0.31 0.18 0.11 1.69+ 
Specific Instructions -0.06 0.16 -0.03 -0.40 
Strong Instructions 0.20 0.16 0.08 1.27 
     
R2 0.03+ 
F F(5,347) = 1.89, p = 0.095 
Notes. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
Additionally, separate regressions were performed on each group to examine the 
effects of PTP, attitudes, and instructions, and their interactions.  Three regressions 
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included participants who received confession PTP and answered confession attitude 
items, and the neutral participants responding to the confession attitude questions (n = 
121); three regressions included participants receiving resisting arrest PTP and attitude 
questions, and neutral participants responding to the resisting arrest items (n = 115); two 
regressions included participants receiving prior record PTP and attitude questions, and 
their corresponding neutral participants (n = 117). 
Confession 
Three regressions were performed to test hypotheses pertaining to confession 
PTP, confession attitudes, and jury instructions.  The first regression only included main 
effects.  The overall model was not significant, R2 = 0.05, F (4,116) = 1.53, p = 0.20 (see 
Table 9 for regression coefficients).  One predictor was significant; participants receiving 
strong jury instructions assigned higher guilt ratings than participants receiving standard 
instructions (β = 0.23, t = 2.13, p = 0.04). 
The second model, in which interaction terms were added, also was not 
significant, R2= 0.10, F (11,109) = 1.14, p = 0.34 (see Table 9 for regression 
coefficients).  The main effect of strong jury instructions was no longer significant; 
instead, the interaction between confession PTP and strong instructions was significant (β 
= 0.53, t = 2.21, p = 0.03).  As previously discussed, when higher-order interaction terms 
are not significant, Aiken and West (1991) recommend using a step-down procedure, in 
which the three-way interaction terms and any two-way terms not being used to test a 
hypothesis are dropped, and the regression re-performed.  
Ta
bl
e 
9.
 P
re
di
ct
in
g 
G
ui
lt 
R
at
in
g 
w
ith
 C
on
fe
ss
io
n 
PT
P,
 A
tti
tu
de
, a
nd
 In
st
ru
ct
io
ns
 
 
M
od
el
 1
 
M
od
el
 2
 
M
od
el
 3
 
Pr
ed
ic
to
r 
B 
SE
 
β 
t 
B 
SE
 
β 
t 
B 
SE
 
β 
t 
C
on
st
an
t 
4.
55
 
0.
27
 
 
16
.9
0*
*
4.
98
 
0.
38
 
 
13
.2
7*
*
4.
95
 
0.
36
 
 
13
.6
2*
*
PT
P 
0.
22
 
0.
26
 
0.
08
 
0.
86
 
-0
.3
9 
0.
44
 
-0
.1
4 
-0
.8
9 
-0
.3
2 
0.
42
 
-0
.1
1 
-0
.7
5 
Sp
ec
ifi
c 
In
st
ru
ct
io
ns
 
0.
11
 
0.
27
 
0.
04
 
0.
69
 
-0
.1
9 
0.
55
 
-0
.0
7 
-0
.3
4 
-0
.1
0 
0.
52
 
-0
.0
4 
-0
.1
9 
St
ro
ng
 In
st
ru
ct
io
ns
 
0.
58
 
0.
27
 
0.
23
 
2.
13
*  
-0
.5
5 
0.
59
 
-0
.2
1 
-0
.9
5 
-0
.5
0 
0.
57
 
-0
.2
0 
-0
.8
9 
A
tti
tu
de
 
0.
08
 
0.
15
 
0.
05
 
0.
56
 
-0
.4
2 
0.
53
 
-0
.2
7 
-0
.8
0 
-0
.2
5 
0.
31
 
-0
.1
6 
-0
.8
1 
PT
P 
X
 S
pe
ci
fic
 
 
 
 
 
0.
46
 
0.
64
 
0.
16
 
0.
72
 
0.
33
 
0.
61
 
0.
12
 
0.
54
 
PT
P 
X
 S
tro
ng
 
 
 
 
 
1.
46
 
0.
66
 
0.
53
 
2.
21
*  
1.
40
 
0.
65
 
0.
51
 
2.
16
*  
PT
P 
X
 A
tti
tu
de
 
 
 
 
 
0.
77
 
0.
61
 
0.
43
 
1.
27
 
0.
42
 
0.
35
 
0.
23
 
1.
20
 
A
tti
tu
de
 X
 S
pe
ci
fic
 
 
 
 
 
0.
47
 
0.
78
 
0.
18
 
0.
60
 
 
 
 
 
A
tti
tu
de
 X
 S
tro
ng
 
 
 
 
 
0.
09
 
0.
75
 
0.
03
 
0.
12
 
 
 
 
 
PT
P 
X
 A
tti
tu
de
 X
 S
pe
ci
fic
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.6
7 
0.
87
 
-0
.2
3 
-0
.7
7 
 
 
 
 
PT
P 
X
 A
tti
tu
de
 X
 S
tro
ng
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.4
5 
0.
87
 
-0
.1
2 
-0
.5
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R2
 
0.
05
 
0.
10
 
0.
09
 
F 
F(
4,
11
6)
 =
 1
.5
3,
 p
 =
 0
.2
0 
F(
11
,1
09
) =
 1
.1
4,
 p
 =
 0
.3
4 
F(
7,
11
3)
 =
 1
.6
8,
 p
 =
 0
.1
2 
ΔR
2  
 
0.
05
 
0.
04
 
ΔF
 
 
ΔF
(7
,1
09
) =
 0
.9
2,
 p
 =
 0
.4
9 
ΔF
(4
,1
13
) =
 1
.8
2,
 p
 =
 0
.1
3 
N
ot
es
. P
TP
 =
 C
on
fe
ss
io
n 
PT
P 
(R
ec
ei
ve
d 
= 
1,
 N
eu
tra
l =
 0
); 
A
tti
tu
de
 =
 O
ve
ra
ll 
C
on
fe
ss
io
n 
A
tti
tu
de
 (C
en
te
re
d)
; S
pe
ci
fic
 =
 S
pe
ci
fic
 
Ju
ry
 In
st
ru
ct
io
ns
 c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 S
ta
nd
ar
d;
 S
tro
ng
 =
 S
tro
ng
 Ju
ry
 In
st
ru
ct
io
ns
 c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 S
ta
nd
ar
d;
 M
od
el
 2
 a
dd
s a
ll 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
te
rm
s;
 
M
od
el
 3
 in
cl
ud
es
 o
nl
y 
tw
o-
w
ay
 te
rm
s u
se
d 
to
 te
st
 h
yp
ot
he
se
s;
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 R
2  a
nd
 F
 c
om
pa
re
s t
he
 c
ur
re
nt
 m
od
el
 to
 M
od
el
 1
; *
 p
 <
 0
.0
5,
 
**
 p
 <
 0
.0
1.
64
 
64 
  
65
A third regression was performed, dropping the two three-way interaction 
terms, and two attitudes x instructions terms.  This model was also not significant, R2= 
0.09, F (7,113) = 1.68, p = 0.12 (see Table 9 for regression coefficients).  Once again, the 
interaction between confession PTP and strong instructions was significant (β = 0.51, t = 
2.16, p = 0.03).  To probe this effect, simple slopes were computed and tested using a 
web-based program by Preacher, Curran, and Bauer (2004a).  Tests of the slopes showed 
that the difference between Confession PTP-Strong Instructions and Neutral PTP-Strong 
Instructions was significant, simple slope = 1.078, SE = 0.477, t = 2.26, p = 0.026.  No 
other differences were significant.  Predicted values are plotted below (see Figure 1). 
Figure 5. Effect of Confession PTP and Instructions (Attitude = Mean). 
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Three regressions were performed to test hypotheses pertaining to resisting arrest 
PTP, resisting arrest attitudes, and jury instructions.  The first regression only included 
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main effects.  The overall model was not significant, R2 = 0.05, F (4,110) = 1.43, p = 
0.23 (see Table 10 for regression coefficients).  One predictor, attitudes, was significant; 
participants with stronger beliefs that resisting arrest indicates guilt assigned higher guilt 
ratings (β = 0.19, t = 2.01, p = 0.05). 
The second model, in which interaction terms were added, also was not 
significant, R2= 0.14, F (11,103) = 1.57, p = 0.12 (see Table 10 for regression 
coefficients).  The main effect of attitude was no longer significant, but the interaction 
between resisting arrest PTP and specific instructions was marginally significant (β = 
0.47, t = 1.91, p = 0.06).  Because the higher order (three-way interaction) terms were not 
significant, these terms and two-way terms not being used to test hypotheses were 
dropped, and the regression was performed again. 
The third model was marginally significant, R2= 0.10, F (7,107) = 1.77, p = 0.10 
(see Table 10 for regression coefficients).  The main effect of specific instructions was 
significant (β = -0.54, t = -2.35, p = 0.02).  Overall, participants receiving specific jury 
instructions assigned lower guilt ratings than participants receiving standard instructions.  
This was qualified, however, by a significant interaction between resisting arrest PTP and 
specific instructions (β = 0.61, t = 2.53, p = 0.01).  To probe this effect, simple slopes 
were calculated and tested using a web-based program (Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 
2004a).  The difference between Resisting Arrest PTP-Specific Instructions and Neutral 
PTP-Specific Instructions was significant, with participants receiving specific 
instructions and biasing PTP assigning higher guilt ratings than participants receiving 
specific instructions and neutral PTP, simple slope =  1.156, SE = 0.453, t = 2.55,    
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p = 0.012.  No other differences were significant.  (Predicted values are plotted in 
Figure 2.) 
 Figure 6. Effect of Resisting Arrest PTP and Instructions (Attitude = Mean). 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Standard Specif ic Strong
G
ui
lt 
R
at
in
g
Neutral PTP
Resisting PTP
 
G
ui
lt 
R
at
in
g 
Prior Record 
Two regressions were performed to test hypotheses pertaining to prior record 
PTP, prior record attitudes, and jury instructions.  The first regression only included main 
effects.  The overall model was significant, R2 = 0.14, F (4,112) = 4.46, p = 0.002 (see 
Table 11 for regression coefficients).  One predictor was significant; participants with 
stronger attitudes toward prior record information indicating guilt gave higher guilt 
ratings (β = 0.33, t = 3.71, p = 0.003).  Additionally, the effect of PTP was marginally 
significant, with participants receiving prior record PTP assigning higher guilt rating than 
participants receiving neutral PTP (β = 0.14, t = 1.64, p = 0.10).   
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The second model, in which interaction terms were added, was also significant, 
R2= 0.27, F (11,105) = 3.56, p = 0.0003 (see Table 11 for regression coefficients).  The 
main effect of attitudes was still significant, but was in the opposite direction (β = -1.01, t 
= -2.72, p = 0.01).  This effect was qualified by several significant interactions, including 
a significant interaction between PTP and attitude, a significant three-way interaction 
with PTP, attitude, and strong jury instructions (β = -0.64, t = -2.20, p = 0.03), and a 
marginally significant three-way interaction with PTP, attitude, and specific jury 
instructions (β = -0.41, t = -1.74, p = 0.09).   
To probe these interactions, simple slopes were calculated and tested using a web-
based program for three-way interactions (Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2004b).  Analyses 
show that participants who have a strong attitude that a prior record indicates guilt assign 
a higher guilt rating when they learned of a prior record in PTP, and assign a lower guilt 
rating when PTP was neutral, simple slope = -1.204, SE = 0.626, t = -1.922, p = 0.057.  
On the other hand, participants who do not believe a prior record indicates guilt assign a 
lower guilt rating when PTP contains prior record and a higher guilt rating when PTP is 
neutral, simple slope = 2.451, SE = 0.698, t = 3.513, p=0.0007.  This effect is plotted in 
Figure 3. 
This effect is qualified, however, by significant three-way interactions between 
PTP, attitude, and instructions.  When standard instructions are used, attitude has a strong 
influence on the verdicts preferences of both participants receiving neutral and biasing 
PTP.  When specific instructions are used, attitude no longer has an effect for those  
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receiving neutral PTP, but has the expected effect among those receiving prior record 
PTP.  Finally, when strong instructions are used, attitude has a small effect on verdict.  
These results confirm that attitude interacts with PTP information, but only when 
standard instructions are used.  Stronger instructions appear to reduce this effect.    
Predicted values for combinations of PTP (Priors or Neutral), Instructions (Specific or 
Strong), and Attitudes (-1 SD or +1 SD) are plotted below; see Figure 4 for the interaction 
when specific instructions are used, and Figure 5 for the interaction when strong 
instructions are used.   
Figure 7. Effect of Prior Record (Priors) PTP and Attitude (Instructions = Standard). 
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Figure 8. Effect of Prior Record (Priors) PTP and Attitude (Instructions = Specific). 
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Figure 9. Effect of Prior Record (Priors) PTP and Attitude (Instructions = Strong). 
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Logistic Regression Analyses on Verdict 
Verdict data were analyzed in logistic multiple regressions.  First, the overall 
effects of PTP and instructions were analyzed, with three dummy variables reflecting 
PTP (with neutral as the comparison group) and two dummy variable reflecting 
instructions (with standard as the comparison group).  The model provided a poor fit for 
the data, χ2 (df = 347) = 485.54, p < 0.0001, correctly predicting 67.4 percent of verdicts, 
and yielded no significant predictors (see Table 12 for coefficients). 
Table 12. Predicting Verdict with Type of PTP and Jury Instructions. 
Predictor B SE Wald 
Constant -0.26 0.266 -0.98 
Confession PTP 0.14 0.305 0.47 
Resisting Arrest PTP -0.20 0.311 -0.64 
Prior Record PTP 0.10 0.305 0.31 
Specific Instructions 0.13 0.261 0.51 
Strong Instructions 0.22 0.263 0.85 
Notes. No predictors were significant. 
Additional logistic regressions were performed to examine PTP, attitudes, and 
instructions: three regressions to include “confession” participants; three regressions 
including “resisting arrest” participants; and three regressions including “prior record” 
participants. 
Confession  
The first regression included the main effects of PTP, instructions, and attitude.  
Overall, the model provided a poor fit for the data, χ2 (df = 116) = 163.92, p = 0.0023, 
correctly predicting 80.2 percent of verdicts; none of the variables were significant 
predictors of verdict (see Table 13 for coefficients).   
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Table 13. Predicting Verdict with Confession PTP, Attitude, and Instructions.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Predictor B SE Wald B SE Wald B SE Wald
Constant -0.45 0.46 -0.97 0.17 0.62 0.27 0.14 0.61 0.22 
PTP 0.08 0.44 0.18 -0.77 0.74 -1.03 -0.73 0.73 -1.01 
Specific 0.48 0.46 1.04 -0.90 1.14 -0.79 -0.19 0.88 -0.22 
Strong 0.65 0.46 1.40 -1.08 1.07 -0.94 -0.59 0.97 -0.61 
Attitude 0.40 0.25 1.57 0.07 0.89 0.08 0.29 0.53 0.54 
PTP X Specific    1.75 1.28 1.37 0.95 1.04 0.91 
PTP X Strong    1.97 1.20 1.64+ 1.64 1.11 1.47 
PTP X Attitude    0.40 1.02 0.39 0.17 0.61 0.28 
Attitude X Specific    3.89 2.64 -0.90    
Attitude X Strong    -1.23 1.36 -0.90    
PTP X Attitude X Specific    -3.52 2.74 -1.29    
PTP X Attitude X Strong    0.66 1.56 0.42    
Notes. PTP = Confession PTP (Received = 1, Neutral = 0); Attitude = Overall Confession 
Attitude (Centered); Specific = Specific Jury Instructions compared to Standard; Strong = 
Strong Jury Instructions compared to Standard; Model 2 adds all interaction terms; Model 
3 includes only two-way terms used to test hypotheses; + p < 0.10 
In the second model, two- and three-way interactions were added.  Once again, 
this model provided poor fit for the data, χ2 (df = 109) = 152.93, p = 0.004, predicting 
87.6 percent of verdicts.  The interaction between PTP and strong instructions was 
marginally significant; participants receiving PTP and strong instructions were over 3 
times more likely to vote guilty than participants receiving neutral PTP and strong 
instructions (see Table 13 for coefficients).  Because the overall model provided a poor 
fit, and neither of the three-way interactions was significant, three-way interactions and 
two-way interactions between attitude and instructions were removed, and the logistic 
regression was re-performed.  This third model still provided poor fit for the data, χ2 (df = 
113) = 161.65, p = 0.002, correctly predicting 82.6 percent of verdicts, and yielded no 
significant predictors (see Table 13 for regression coefficients).   
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Resisting Arrest 
The first logistic regression included only main effects.  This model provided 
poor fit for the data, χ2 (df = 110) = 152.01, p = 0.005, predicting 70.4 percent of verdicts, 
and yielded no significant predictors (see Table 14 for regression coefficients).   
Table 14. Predicting Verdict with Resisting Arrest PTP, Attitude, and Instructions.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Predictor B SE Wald B SE Wald B SE Wald
Constant -0.49 0.48 -1.03 -0.15 0.70 -0.21 -0.15 0.69 -0.22 
PTP -0.02 0.45 -0.05 -0.46 0.80 -0.58 -0.45 0.79 -0.57 
Specific 0.51 0.46 1.11 -0.38 1.07 -0.36 -1.01 1.11 -0.91 
Strong -0.03 0.48 -0.07 0.35 1.09 0.32 0.19 0.95 0.20 
Attitude 0.31 0.22 1.41 0.79 1.12 0.70 0.71 0.55 1.30 
PTP X Specific    1.25 1.20 1.05 1.88 1.23 1.53 
PTP X Strong    -0.51 1.24 -0.42 -0.36 1.11 -0.32 
PTP X Attitude    -0.45 1.18 -0.38 -4163.002 0.60 -0.69 
Attitude X Specific    -1.11 1.38 -0.80    
Attitude X Strong    1.49 1.76 0.85    
PTP X Attitude X Specific    0.98 1.49 0.66    
PTP X Attitude X Strong    -1.56 1.90 -0.82    
Notes. PTP = Resisting Arrest PTP (Received = 1, Neutral = 0); Attitude = Overall 
Resisting Arrest Attitude (Centered); Specific = Specific Jury Instructions compared to 
Standard; Strong = Strong Jury Instructions compared to Standard; Model 2 adds all 
interaction terms; Model 3 includes only two-way terms used to test hypotheses; no 
predictors were significant 
The second model, which added interaction terms, also provided poor fit, χ2 (df = 
103) = 144.41, p = 0.004, predicting 79.1 percent of verdicts; once again, there were no 
significant predictors (see Table 14 for regression coefficients).  The third model, which 
dropped the three-way and attitude by instructions interaction terms, provided poor fit, χ2 
(df = 107) = 147.97, p = 0.005, predicted 76.5 percent of verdicts, and yielded no 
significant predictors (see Table 14 for regression coefficients). 
                                                 
2 According to Tabachnick & Fidell (2001), large parameter estimates and standard errors occur when there 
are too few cases to adequately test the number of predictors. 
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Prior Record 
The first logistic regression included only main effects.  This model provided 
poor fit for the data, χ2 (df = 112) = 144.38, p = 0.021, predicting 83.8 percent of verdicts.  
One variable, attitude, was a significant predictor (coefficient = 1.05, Wald test = 3.575, p 
= 0.004); individuals with a strong attitude (1 SD above the mean) are over 2 times more 
likely to vote guilty than individuals with a neutral (mean level) attitude and over 5 times 
more likely to vote guilt than individuals with a weak attitude (1 SD below the mean; see 
Table 15 for regression coefficients).   
Table 15. Predicting Verdict with Prior Record PTP, Attitude, and Instructions.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Predictor B SE Wald B SE Wald B SE Wald 
Constant 0.16 0.51 0.32 0.16 0.84 0.19 0.20 0.68 0.30 
PTP 0.06 0.50 0.13 0.11 0.95 0.12 0.04 0.80 0.05 
Specific -0.77 0.50 -1.56 18.83 1499.00 -0.01 -2.40 1.33 -1.80+ 
Strong -0.02 0.50 -0.04 1.19 1.30 0.92 1.11 1.12 0.99 
Attitude 1.05 0.29 3.58** -2.79 1.91 -1.46 -0.53 0.64 -0.83 
PTP X Specific    18.17 1499.00 0.01 1.75 1.46 1.20 
PTP X Strong    -1.48 1.43 -1.03 -1.37 1.27 -1.07 
PTP X Attitude    4.46 2.04 2.18* 2.02 0.74 2.72** 
Attitude X Specific    31.79 2419.08 0.01    
Attitude X Strong    2.17 2.17 1.00    
PTP X Attitude X Specific    -32.15 2419.08 -0.01    
PTP X Attitude X Strong    2.35 2.36 -0.99    
Notes. PTP = Prior Record PTP (Received = 1, Neutral = 0); Attitude = Overall Prior 
Record Attitude (Centered); Specific = Specific Jury Instructions compared to Standard; 
Strong = Strong Jury Instructions compared to Standard; Model 2 adds all interaction 
terms; Model 3 includes only two-way terms used to test hypotheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.01 
The second model, which added interaction terms, provided acceptable fit, χ2 (df 
= 105) = 127.60, p = 0.066, and predicted 85.5 percent of verdicts; additionally, the 
interaction between attitude and PTP was significant (see Table 15 for regression 
coefficients).  Though this model provided acceptable fit for the data, dropping the non-
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significant three-way interaction and attitude x instructions interactions would provide 
more power.   
The third model, which dropped the three-way and attitude by instructions 
interaction terms, also provided acceptable fit, χ2 (df = 109) = 133.39, p = 0.056, and 
predicted 87.2 percent of verdicts.  Additionally, the interaction between attitude and PTP 
was still significant (see Table 15 for regression coefficients).  This effect was probed 
using the web-based program for two-way interactions (Preacher, Curran, and Bauer, 
2004a).  Though none of the simple slopes were significant, the following trends were 
observed.  Participants with a weak attitude (1 SD below the mean) who received neutral 
PTP were 4.5 times more likely to vote guilty than participants with low attitude who 
received prior record PTP, simple slope = -1.513, SE = 0.962, t = -1.572, p = 0.119, OR = 
4.54.  On the other hand, the effect was reversed for participants with strong attitude (1 
SD above the mean); participants who received prior record PTP were almost 5 times 
more likely to vote guilty than participants with a strong attitude who received neutral 
PTP, simple slope = 1.600, SE = 1.012, t = 1.580, p = 0.117, OR = 4.95. 
Overall Results 
Because this study examined so many variable, some clarification of study 
findings, and how they align with hypotheses is necessary.  Table 16 below details for 
each hypothesized effect what was found and a brief interpretation of the finding.  As the 
table shows, more significant effects were found for guilt rating than verdict.  Attitude 
only showed a significant interaction with prior record PTP, but was in the expected 
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direction.  Additionally, instructions weakened the effects of resisting arrest PTP and 
prior record PTP, but actually strengthened the effect of confession PTP.   
Table 16. Chart of Hypothesized Effects and Significant Results. 
Hypothesis Effect on Guilt Rating? Effect on Verdict? 
Effect of PTP Information 
     Confession   Confession PTP resulted in higher guilt ratings None 
     Prior Record    Prior record PTP results in marginally higher guilt ratings None 
     Resisting Arrest   None None 
PTP x Attitude Interaction 
     Confession   None None 
     Prior Record    Strong attitude increased effect of PTP 
Strong attitude increased 
effect of PTP 
     Resisting Arrest   None None 
PTP x Admonition Interaction 
     Confession   
Strong instructions strengthened 
effect of PTP – Psychological 
Reactance 
Similar to guilt rating effect 
but marginally significant 
     Prior Record    None None 
     Resisting Arrest   
Specific instructions strengthened 
effect of PTP – Psychological 
Reactance, Ironic Process, or 
Thought Suppression 
None 
PTP x Attitude x Admonition Interaction 
     Confession   None None 
     Prior Record    Specific and strong instructions weakened effect of PTP and attitude None 
     Resisting Arrest   None None 
Exploratory Analyses 
Though some hypotheses were supported, only small proportions of total variance 
in guilt ratings and verdicts were explained.  Other variables, including participant 
attitudes not examined in previous analyses, may explain these outcomes.  According to 
Finkel (1995), individual attitudes and knowledge influence legal decisions and provide 
basic guidelines on the weighting of specific case facts.  Though it was expected that 
attitudes directly relevant to PTP information would determine whether PTP is used in 
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determining guilt, other attitudes relevant to case evidence and information may also 
determine guilt.  Therefore, exploratory analyses using other attitude variables relevant to 
the specific facts of the case were conducted.   
In addition to the attitude questions relevant to the PTP information received, 
participants provided a variety of attitudes that may be relevant to the specific case, 
including whether a defendant should be required to testify, and whether illegal or 
circumstantial evidence should be used in court.  Furthermore, it has been argued that 
simply learning that a person has been arrested for a crime may be biasing and may lead 
people to believe the arrestee is guilty (Bruschke & Loges, 1999); as with PTP 
information, however, learning that a person has been arrested would only be biasing if 
an individual believes that police do not make mistakes and only arrest guilty people.  
Therefore, attitudes about police or defendant behavior during arrest would also be 
relevant to the current case, where all participants (including those in the neutral PTP 
group) received a statement about the arrest prior to reading the court transcript.  
Multiple linear regression was performed, regressing guilt rating onto attitude 
questions about evidence, police behavior, and suspect behavior.  Overall, the model was 
significant, R2 = 0.07, F (7,343) = 3.42, p = 0.002 (see Table 17 for regression 
coefficients).  One predictor was significant; participants who more strongly believed that 
police should be able to arrest people who “look suspicious” gave higher guilt ratings, β = 
0.15, t = 2.77, p = 0.006.  Additionally, participants who more strongly believed that 
illegal evidence should be allowed in court gave marginally higher guilt ratings, β = 0.10, 
t = 1.81, p = 0.07. 
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These variables were also used in a logistic regression with verdict.  Though 
overall the model provided a poor fit for the data, χ2 (df = 343) = 440.38, p = 0.0003, 
predicting only 55 percent of verdicts, three predictors were significant (see Table 17 for 
regression coefficients).  As with guilt rating, a belief that police should be able to arrest 
“suspicious” people increased guilty verdicts.  Participants who more strongly believed 
circumstantial evidence should never be used to convict were 1.5 times less likely to find 
the defendant guilty than participants with a neutral attitude.  Finally, participants who 
strongly believed upstanding citizens have nothing to fear from the police were 1.3 times 
more likely to find the defendant guilty than participants with a neutral attitude. 
Table 17. Regressions Using Evidence, Police Behavior, and Suspect Behavior Attitudes. 
 DV: Guilt Rating DV: Verdict 
Predictor B SE β t B SE Wald 
Constant 3.96 0.57  6.90 -0.94 1.04 -0.90 
Allow Illegal Evidence 0.11 0.06 0.10 1.81+ 0.14 0.11 1.35 
Allow Circumstantial Evidence -0.09 0.07 -0.07 -1.33 -0.45 0.13 -3.50**
Defendant Required to Testify 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.17 0.11 0.13 0.87 
Arrest Suspicious People 0.18 0.07 0.15 2.77** 0.37 0.12 3.03** 
Upstanding Citizens 0.09 0.06 0.08 1.40 0.26 0.11 2.38* 
Police Overzealous -0.07 0.07 -0.05 -0.93 0.07 0.13 0.54 
Police Abuse Power 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.96 -0.14 0.16 -0.86 
Notes. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
Another finding that should be further examined is explanations for verdict 
selections and how verdict relates to guilt rating.  Though guilt rating and verdict were 
strongly correlated (r = 0.61), variables that significantly predicted guilt did not also 
predict verdict, and vice versa.  The guilt rating ranged from 1 to 7, with the endpoints 
“Definitely Not Guilty” and “Definitely Guilty,” respectively.  One would expect then, 
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that participants selecting “7” on the guilt rating would also select “guilty”; the table 
below (Table 18) shows that this is not the case.   
Table 18. Frequencies (and Percentages) of Guilt Rating by Verdict. 
Guilt Rating Not Guilty Guilty Total 
1 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 
2 13 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 13 
3 53 (98.1%) 1 (1.9%) 54 
4 43 (93.5%) 3 (6.5%) 46 
5 57 (47.1%) 64 (52.9%) 121 
6 21 (18.9%) 90 (81.1%) 111 
7 1 (12.5%) 7 (87.5%) 8 
Total 188 (53.3%) 165 (46.7%) 353 
One possibility is that, as Finkel (1995) suggests, attitudes change the way one 
considers the evidence, and alters the threshold one sets for guilt.  Additionally, 
participants who believe that the defendant is definitely or probably guilty, but still select 
a not guilty verdict, may be responding to their own beliefs about justice, such as a belief 
that it is better to free a guilty defendant than convict an innocent defendant.  To test 
these hypotheses, two additional logistic regressions were performed, regressing verdict 
onto guilt rating, attitudes relating to justice issues (such as beliefs about the danger of 
convicting the innocent and the importance of liberty), and attitudes relating to the 
“threshold” for guilt (such as what to do if a person is “obviously guilty” or the meaning 
of “reasonable doubt”).  The first model provided good fit for the data, χ2 (df = 344) = 
307.98, p = 0.92, correctly predicting 73.5 percent of verdicts; two predictors were 
significant (see Table 19).  Guilt rating was a strong predictor of verdict.  Additionally, 
participants who strongly believe that too many obviously guilty are acquitted were more 
likely to vote guilty. 
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Table 19. Predicting Guilt with Criminal Justice Attitudes. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Predictor B SE Wald B SE Wald 
Constant -0.46 0.16 -2.93 -0.45 0.16 -2.78**
Obviously Guilty 0.37 0.16 2.29* 0.29 0.18 1.64+ 
Reasonable Doubt -0.17 0.14 -1.22 -0.06 0.15 -0.38 
Free Guilty v. Convict Innocent -0.17 0.14 -1.23 -0.17 0.16 -1.07 
Meaning of True Liberty -0.01 0.16 -0.06 0.03 0.17 0.16 
Juries Use Evidence Only 0.07 0.14 0.48 -0.01 0.16 -0.1 
Guilt Rating 1.81 0.20 8.96** 1.89 0.22 8.65** 
ObGuilt x Guilt Rating    0.15 0.22 0.67 
ReasDoubt x Guilt Rating    -0.32 0.18 -1.81+ 
FreeGuilt x Guilt Rating    0.03 0.18 0.14 
Liberty x Guilt Rating    -0.17 0.19 -0.88 
JurEvidence x Guilt Rating    0.16 0.19 0.82 
Notes. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
In the second model, interactions were created between each attitude and guilt 
rating.  Overall, the model provided good fit for the data, χ2 (df = 339) = 301.01, p = 0.93, 
predicting 74.1 percent of verdicts.  Guilt remained a significant predictor and attitude 
toward “obviously guilty” was marginally significant (see Table 19).  Additionally, the 
interaction between “reasonable doubt” attitude and guilt rating was marginally 
significant.  Post-hoc probing (using Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2004a) revealed that, 
though few groups convicted when their guilt rating was low, participants who placed 
more burden of proof on the defendant (to prove innocent beyond a reasonable doubt) 
convicted at a lower guilt rating than participants who placed less burden on the 
defendant (see Figure 5 below for predicted values).  For example, an individual who 
assigned a guilt rating of 6, and who places more burden of proof on the defendant, has a 
91.1 percent change of convicting, while an individual assigning a guilt rating of 6 who 
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does not expect the defendant to prove innocence beyond a reasonable doubt has only a 
77.9 percent chance of convicting. 
Figure 10. Effect of Guilt Rating and Reasonable Doubt Attitude. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
DISCUSSION 
The current study both advances our understanding of PTP effects and raises new 
questions for further research.  It was hypothesized that PTP information would only bias 
participants who had strong beliefs that such information indicated guilt, and that jury 
instructions would affect participants differently depending on their attitude and PTP 
information received.  This hypothesis was supported in part, but only among participants 
receiving prior record PTP.  That is, when participants did not believe a prior record 
indicated guilt, receiving PTP information and standard jury instructions resulted in a 
lower guilt rating, while among participants with a strong belief that a prior record 
indicated guilt, receipt of PTP information and standard jury instructions increased guilt 
rating.  More specific jury instructions made PTP participants provide guilt ratings that 
were more similar to neutral participants.  The effect of these variables on dichotomous 
verdicts was slightly different, but it was found that participants with a strong attitude 
toward prior record were more likely to vote guilty in the presence of PTP and 
participants who did not believe prior record indicated guilt were less likely to vote guilty 
in the presence of PTP.   
These patterns differ slightly from what was hypothesized.  Instructions were 
expected to affect verdicts among participants with weaker attitudes, and not participants 
with strong attitudes.  Instead, specific and strong instructions served to weaken the 
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effects of PTP among both participants with weak and strong attitudes, making their 
guilt ratings similar to those receiving neutral PTP.  Because there did not appear to be a 
different pattern for low and high attitude participants, belief perseverance is not a good 
explanation for these results.  Additionally, psychological reactivity is also probably not 
occurring, because if it were, stronger instructions would have increased guilt ratings.   
Among the other two PTP groups, confession, and resisting arrest, no three-way 
interactions were observed, but some significant effects were uncovered.  Knowledge of a 
confession resulted in higher guilt ratings, though this information alone was not enough 
to affect dichotomous verdicts.  Additionally, jury instructions affected guilt rating 
among participants receiving confession or resisting arrest PTP, but not in the same way 
as it did among participants receiving prior record PTP.  That is, instructions that 
specifically addressed PTP led to increases in guilt ratings, and also marginally increased 
guilty verdicts when confession PTP was used.  Once again, because attitudes did not 
play a role, belief perseverance is probably not the culprit.  Thought suppression or ironic 
processes may still explain these results, but psychological reactivity may also be a 
possibility, since specific instructions to ignore such information strengthened their 
effects.  Finally, when resisting arrest PTP was used, participants with a stronger attitude 
that resisting arrest implied guilt assigned higher guilt ratings; this effect was not reduced 
by jury instructions to ignore outside information, and specific instructions strengthened 
the effect of PTP on guilt rating. 
Many PTP researchers have hypothesized that certain PTP content will be more 
biasing than other content.  Otto, Penrod, and Dexter (1994), for instance, compared 
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different types of PTP information, including information on the defendant’s negative 
character, weak inadmissible evidence, strong inadmissible evidence, and information on 
the defendant’s socioeconomic status, and found that negative character information had 
the strongest effect on verdict. Additionally, studies have shown that participants 
receiving confession information (DeLuca, 1979) and prior record information 
(Hvistendahl, 1979) show more bias toward guilt than participants receiving neutral 
information.  It may be that some information is inherently more biasing than other 
information.  Additionally, individuals may respond differently to instructions to ignore 
certain pieces of information, showing the ability to ignore some information when asked 
and, at other times, being more likely to use certain information even when it should be 
ignored.  More research is needed to explore this possibility.  One method that has not 
been used would be to have participants read more than one type of PTP content and rate 
how damaging certain information is comparatively. 
Variation in attitudes of participants may also explain why certain information 
appears more biasing.  Though participants were randomly assigned to PTP and jury 
instruction conditions, attitudes were measured after these assignments had already been 
made.  Measuring attitudes beforehand, and stratifying assignment to groups based on 
attitude would guarantee that participants with low, mean, and high attitudes were 
distributed equally across conditions.  This method may make interactions with attitude 
easier to detect.  Future research should include this additional step, which would help to 
illuminate whether certain information is more biasing or whether participant attitudes 
explain these different results. 
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Despite the fact that key hypotheses were not supported, this study provides 
more evidence for the biasing effects of PTP.  It is important to keep in mind, however, 
that PTP is not always biasing, and that some studies do not find PTP effects, or may 
even find the opposite effect – that PTP reduces bias toward guilt.  Type of case and 
amount of PTP may explain differences in results compared to other studies of PTP.  As 
previously discussed, most PTP studies use homicide or sexual assault cases, which use 
different types of evidence; these cases may also be considered more sensational by the 
public and may garner more attention, both in the amount of media coverage of the event 
as well as attention to the media information by consumers.  Additionally, this study used 
one article with only one sentence that introduced the biasing information; many other 
studies of PTP either use more articles or more biasing information within a single 
article.  Bruschke and Loges (1999) found, in an analysis of 134 federal first-degree 
murder cases that about 46 percent received no publicity, and 50 percent received 
between 1 and 31 articles.  Though the number of articles can range much higher than 
that, with one case in their study being covered in 141 articles, studies on cases receiving 
small to moderate amounts of PTP may provide results that are more applicable to real 
cases. 
According to Finkel (1995), however, different results may be due to more than 
crime of which the defendant was accused or amount of PTP.  He argues that the story 
potential jurors form to explain the events, and their interpretations of individual case 
facts, will determine the outcome, meaning effects would be expected to vary for 
different individual cases.  Additionally, the information used to generate a story can 
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come from a variety of places, including pre-existing attitudes, case facts heard in 
court, and extralegal information from sources like PTP.  Even if jurors do not come into 
the courtroom with a pre-developed story, they may use information heard beforehand to 
shape the story they develop while in court to create a cohesive account of the events and 
to attribute blame.   
It is difficult to determine how PTP information was used, however, because 
participants did not respond to any questions about trial evidence or how they arrived at 
their verdict. This information may provide insight into how, and if, participants used 
outside information, such as PTP or attitudes, to understand the case and arrive at an 
outcome.  Because participants were already completing an attitude questionnaire and 
reading a trial transcript, a measure of responses to evidence was not included in the 
present study, to reduce the possibility of participant fatigue.  One way to reduce this 
fatigue would have been to expose participants to the PTP and/or given the attitude 
measure at a different time.  Researchers should consider including measures of reactions 
to the trial, either through an interview or standardized questionnaire, and may also wish 
to conduct studies over two or more sessions, to lessen the chance for fatigue and more 
accurately reflect real-life exposure to PTP. 
When a meta-analysis exists on a topic, many researchers (e.g., Chrzanowski, 
2006) will compare their results to those obtained by the meta-analysis.  This can help to 
demonstrate whether current findings are in-line with past research on a topic.  In the 
meta-analysis (Locatelli, Fulero, & Kluwe, 2011), I found that effects of PTP obtained 
after presentation of trial evidence were significantly smaller than effects of PTP obtained 
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prior to presentation of trial evidence.  Participants in the current study did not provide 
verdict preferences prior to presentation of the trial, but it would be expected that effects 
of PTP would have been stronger prior to trial presentation because at that point in time, 
participants have less information upon which to base their decisions.  Additionally, 
posttrial effects, though smaller than pretrial effects, were still significant.  The meta-
analysis, however, was unable to examine the influence of individual difference variables 
that may explain why some studies find significant effects of PTP while others do not.  
The current study offers some evidence that individual attitudes can explain variability in 
study findings. 
The meta-analysis also showed an effect of crime, with studies using either sex 
offenses or non-violent crimes finding smaller effects, and studies using homicides or 
other violent crimes finding larger effects.  As stated previously, however, few studies 
included in the meta-analysis used an assault trial, as was used in the current study.  This 
type of crime is less sensational than a homicide trial or certain other violent crimes, and 
verdicts in less sensational cases may be less affected by PTP.  Finally, the meta-analysis 
did not find any significant change in PTP effects when a judicial admonition was used, 
but variations in wording, strength, and method of presentation of the admonition used in 
different studies may also have an effect. 
In addition to this study’s findings on PTP, the current study also provides some 
evidence that attitudes may explain different thresholds for guilt.  Specifically, participant 
attitudes on the meaning of “reasonable doubt” influenced how certain the participant 
needed to be of guilt before convicting.  These findings are only exploratory, however, so 
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additional research is needed to verify these findings.  Such studies could use similar 
methodologies as studies of commonsense justice.  These studies begin with a particular 
case, and manipulate different case facts to determine their effect on the outcome.  For 
example, Finkel (1995) discusses felony murder, a charge allowed in certain US states.  
In felony murder cases, the defendant can be charged with the murder of anyone who 
died while the defendant was committing a crime, whether the murder was caused by the 
defendant (such as the defendant shot and killed a bank teller while robbing the bank) or 
was caused by something else (the bank teller had a heart attack while the defendant was 
robbing the bank).  Though in states that allow felony murder charges, jurors would be 
expected to charge the defendant with murder even in the “heart attack” scenario, Finkel 
found that manipulating how responsible the defendant was for the victim’s death 
affected juror verdicts.  Researchers may be able to explore jurors’ threshold for guilt by 
using a similar method as Finkel and other commonsense justice researchers, while 
including a measure of relevant attitudes and a continuous guilt rating in addition to 
verdict.  This would help to determine whether different thresholds are the result of case 
information, attitudes, or some combination of both.   
Study Limitations 
Many of the results that were expected to be significant were not found in the 
current study.  One possibility is lack of power.  Power analysis was conducted on the 
smallest expected effects for a continuous dependent variable, but not for a dichotomous 
dependent variable, meaning the logistic regression analyses may have been 
underpowered.  Another possibility is that the theories used in the current study failed to 
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correctly predict results.  PTP research has been criticized before as atheoretical 
(Bruschke & Loges, 2004), and only recently have researchers begun to use theory to 
inform hypotheses.  Because attitude theory has been used in other studies of juror 
decision-making (Devine et al., 2001), it seemed only natural to include attitude theory in 
PTP research.  Obviously, additional research is needed to generate or modify theory so 
that it can properly predict PTP effects.   
Attitude theory could also be more fully tested in the context of PTP research by 
including additional questions on responses to the case and its evidence; both 
Chrzanowski (2006) and Honess, Charman, and Levi (2003) included such questions in 
their studies.  For instance, the expectancy-value model was utilized in the current study 
to predict how pre-existing attitudes would interact with PTP information.  This model 
states, however, that as more information is obtained about an attitude target, in this case, 
the defendant, that information will be evaluated (in terms of good-bad, for instance) and 
a strength will be assigned to that belief.  Information about the attitude target includes 
not only PTP, but the case evidence.  Asking jurors to respond to attitude questions about 
different pieces of evidence, or having them respond to open-ended questions about how 
they arrived at their verdict, would allow us to explore how attitudes about the defendant 
were formed, either based on previous attitudes or entirely new attitudes formed on-line, 
and how they combined to determine verdict preference.  Some research suggests that 
attitudes formed on-line are stronger than memory-based attitudes (Bizer, Tormala, 
Rucker, & Petty, 2006), meaning the attitudes participants formed while examining case 
evidence may have a stronger influence on verdict preference than pre-existing attitudes. 
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Similarly, another limitation to the current study is that it did not include any 
questions that would relate to the victim or his behavior.  In this particular case, the 
victim’s eyewitness identification was questioned because he had not been wearing his 
glasses at the time of the attack.  Participant attitudes toward eyewitness testimony and its 
accuracy may explain why some participants chose to convict and others did not.  
Similarly, little information was included about the victim in the PTP, but in some cases, 
PTP may routinely contain information about the victim.  For example, in sexual assault 
cases, the media is generally free to publish information about the victim (Benedict, 
1993), such as past sexual history, that would typically be inadmissible in court (National 
Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse, 2010).  Few studies have examined how victim 
information presented in the media influences verdicts.   
One exception is Chrzanowski (2006), who studied a sexual assault case in 
California, and compared a non-experimental group that had been exposed to PTP on 
their own to an experimental group assigned to view PTP.  Non-experimental participants 
completed questionnaires to determine how much information they recalled viewing and 
whether that information was negative toward the defendants, neutral, or negative toward 
the victim.  The experimental group of participants, from a different location, was 
randomly assigned to view PTP information that was negative toward the defendants, 
neutral, or negative toward the victim.  Participants who were exposed to PTP that was 
negative toward the victim provided higher ratings of innocence than participants 
exposed to PTP that was negative toward the defendants.  The effect was stronger in the 
non-experimental group. 
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No manipulation checks were performed to confirm whether participants 
attended to and understood the pretrial publicity or jury instructions.  Though many 
studies on PTP do not include such manipulation checks, additional questions to probe 
participant memory or comprehension of this information may help to explain results 
obtained, including nonsignificant results.  Another limitation is that, in order to fully test 
hypotheses in the current design, many statistical tests were performed.  Most of these 
tests were planned and specific hypotheses were generated beforehand, but because 
alpha-rates were not adjusted, some significant results, particularly the unexpected 
significant results, could have been obtained merely by chance alone.  Additionally, the 
unplanned exploratory analyses may have also capitalized on chance and inflated 
experiment-wise error.  Additional research is needed to confirm these results. 
The current study was also conducted using undergraduate participants 
completing the study on their own in a lab setting.  Because few studies have examined 
the effect of specific attitudes and their interaction with PTP information and jury 
instructions, this study was considered a necessary first step to determine if larger, more 
realistic studies are necessary.  The obvious next step would be to use participants drawn 
from the community or jury records, and to use more realistic trial materials, such as a 
recorded trial or mock trial.  Additionally, future research should include deliberation and 
group verdicts.  Including group decision making, however, would likely require different 
methods and/or statistical analysis.  That is, attitudes and degree of exposure to PTP 
would be expected to vary across actual juries, meaning that assigning participants 
similar in attitude and exposure would artificially reduce differences among individual 
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jury members, and create a more homogenous group that may arrive at different 
conclusions than a more heterogeneous group.  Of course, allowing attitudes and degree 
of PTP exposure to freely vary would make analysis of group verdicts using conventional 
techniques difficult.  PTP researchers may wish to use a methodology and analysis 
technique that takes into account group member differences and interactions, such as 
social network analysis.   
Social network analysis provides not only theory and methods to understand the 
interaction between individuals and groups, but also specific analysis techniques and 
software to model these complex interactions (Knoke & Yang, 2008).  Specifically, a 
network is made up of two or more actors who are connected in some way; the type and 
strength of connections between actors can vary (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1994).  
Though social network analysis was developed to examine linkages between parties, and 
relationships between number of linkages and social influence, Pattison (1994) argues 
that social network analysis could also be used in social cognitive research, such as 
research on attitude change.  That is, social network analysis could be used to understand 
the process by which one or more individuals in a network exert influence over other 
individuals, resulting in attitude change. 
Additionally, social network analysis could be used to understand information 
sharing in juries.  Shared information has a strong influence on jury outcomes (Kerr & 
Tindale, 2004).  Information shared by the members of the group will be more likely to 
be used than information held by only a few members of the group.  In the case of PTP, 
unless a case received a great deal of publicity, it is reasonable to assume such 
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information would not be shared by all group members.  Even with a great deal of 
publicity, different group members may be aware of different pieces of information, and 
there may be little overlap in knowledge.  Furthermore, PTP information discussed 
during deliberation may or may not have an effect; it could be that participants exposed 
to PTP communicate that information with un-exposed jurors, causing a diffusion of 
treatment, or it could be that non-exposed jurors caution exposed jurors that the 
information being discussed is not from the trial (Bruschke & Loges, 1999), thereby 
nullifying any source monitoring errors.   
There is likely, however, to be variation in individual jurors’ level of influence.  
An influential jury member who discusses biasing PTP information may have a stronger 
effect on the other jury members than a less influential jury member with the same 
information, and so the propensity to use unshared information may vary by jury 
influence.  Combining such research with social network analysis would allow 
researchers to take into account different levels of influence within the jury.  In addition, 
such research could examine varying degrees of jury exposure, comparing juries where 
few members saw PTP to juries where the majority of members saw PTP; this would 
allow researchers to determine a dosage effect and could aid in jury selection, as well as 
in appeals on the basis of PTP.   
Another potential future direction is to examine the interaction of PTP with cases 
involving additional instructions or defenses.  For example, cases in which the defendant 
is eligible for the death penalty usually include the process of death qualification, in 
which potential jurors are questioned about their beliefs on the death penalty, and 
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individuals with moral objections to the death penalty are excluded.  Research has 
already found that death qualification can bias a jury toward conviction.  Butler (2007) 
examined the interaction between PTP and death qualification, and found that death-
qualified participants were more likely to attend to and remember PTP, which could lead 
to additional bias.  Researchers may wish to analyze the interactive effects of PTP in 
other situations, such as in insanity trials, where jurors are also often hesitant to acquit. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSIONS AND GOING FORWARD 
For years, there has been debate in the fields of psychology, communication, and 
law, as well as other related fields, on what should be done to deal with pretrial publicity 
effects.  Unfortunately, there is not necessarily agreement in the field that PTP biases 
verdicts, mainly because of the variation in study results (Bruschke & Loges, 2004).  
Reviews of the literature, and studies like this one, suggest that PTP does not always bias 
verdicts, but in certain cases, and with certain jurors, such information can be biasing.  
Some potential moderating variables, such as case strength or content of PTP, have been 
explored (e.g., Locatelli, Fulero, & Kluwe, 2011), but more guidance is needed for such 
results to be useful for legal professionals.   
This study is one attempt to explain why PTP may be biasing for some jurors.  It 
may not be the information alone, but the pre-existing attitude of the juror, that interacts 
with the case and PTP information.  Though additional work is needed to clarify the 
wording of instructions to correct for these effects, these results give lawyers and judges 
some information as to when PTP may bias jurors, and in how to uncover such bias.  
Unfortunately, knowledge is not enough. 
Why Knowledge is Not Enough 
Even if legal professionals agreed that these and similar findings are valid and 
that PTP may be a cause for concern, using such results to change practice is not 
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necessarily straightforward.  Though one could argue that legal professionals simply 
do not understand psychological research well enough to apply these findings, the issue 
goes deeper than lack of understanding.  Even the most capable and knowledgeable of 
psychological researchers may struggle with applying psychological research findings to 
their lives, let alone to an organization as complex as our legal system.  It is not always 
clear how to put research findings into practice, and there are many barriers that may 
hinder such application.  As Rogers (2003) points out, “Many technologists believe that 
advantageous innovations will sell themselves, that the obvious benefits of a new idea 
will be widely realized by potential adopters, and that the innovation will diffuse rapidly.  
Seldom is this the case” (p. 7). 
Some researchers and organizations have attempted to introduce innovations in 
courtrooms.  These examples show that more direction is needed than simply informing 
courtrooms of beneficial innovations.  Though none of these innovations targeted PTP 
specifically, some target jury procedures that could be useful in cases involving PTP.  For 
example, Sand and Reiss (1985) discuss seven experiments conducted in the District 
Courts of the Second Circuit.  These experiments were planned by a committee 
established as part of the Second Circuit Judicial Conference and appointed by the Chief 
Judge for the Second Circuit.  Second Circuit courtrooms were contacted and invited to 
adopt one or more procedures: (1) permitting attorneys to question potential jurors during 
voir dire, (2) allowing individual questioning of potential jurors in the judge’s chambers, 
(3) instructing jurors before trial, (4) allowing jurors to ask questions, (5) allowing jurors  
to take notes, (6) providing a written copy of the charges to jurors in the deliberation  
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room, and (7) providing jurors with a tape recording of the charges in the deliberation 
room.  Courts were provided with detailed instructions on implementing the changes as 
well as measures to collect data on the effects of these innovations.  Reactions for the 
seven innovations were generally positive, and the authors encouraged future 
experimentation with courtroom innovations.   
Introducing innovations to a legal setting involves examining the process of 
implementation throughout, to assess any barriers or challenges to implementation.  
Whether an innovation is implemented as planned can influence the outcome, and 
differences in implementation may explain why a program “works” in one setting but 
does not in another.  Gondolf (2010) discusses two evaluations of experimental programs 
targeting batterers, one an experimental design that failed to find expected differences, 
and the other, originally designed as an experiment, that was changed to a phased 
implementation.  Gondolf uses these examples to caution against the over-dependence on 
experimental designs, and, more importantly, to encourage researchers using 
experimental designs to study court innovations to examine factors related to 
implementation, adverse events, and unintended consequences.  In fact, lessons learned 
from these and other implementation projects could be useful in planning implementation 
research on innovations for PTP and juror bias. 
One organization that regularly works with courts to develop and implement 
innovations is the Center for Court Innovation.  Founded in the mid-1990s, the Center is 
made up of experts in law and social sciences, such as social work and psychology, who 
work together to introduce innovations to New York courtrooms (Center for Court 
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Innovation, 2011).  Many of the projects within the Center involve “problem-solving 
justice”, in which the goal of the court is to solve the underlying problems of the 
defendant, victim, and community in order to prevent future crime (Berman & Feinblatt, 
2003).  The Center takes a hands-on approach with the courts targeted for innovations, 
and collects data throughout to inform the process and demonstrate program success. 
Recently, the Center for Court Innovation published a report detailing lessons 
learned from various implementation projects (Cissner & Farole, 2009).  These lessons 
are: (1) have a shared vision and identify program goals, (2) identify quantifiable 
objectives, (3) have a plan on how to collect data, (4) formalize the program model, (5) 
be strategic about when and how to engage stakeholders in the planning process, (6) think 
about how to facilitate buy-in from line staff, (7) be realistic, (8) beware the temptation to 
overestimate caseload volume, (9) adapt the program in response to early implementation 
experience, (10) designate a project director, and (11) find political champions.   
Similarly, Visher, Newmark, and Harrell (2007) identified barriers to the 
implementation of a program for domestic violence offenders and victims.  The program, 
known as the Judicial Oversight Demonstration, was designed to increase oversight on 
the offenders, ensure uniform responses to offenders, and coordinate services for victims 
and other affected parties, such as children of the victim.  Though the program led to 
positive changes at the demonstration sites, five “challenges” to implementation were 
identified: (1) gaps in knowledge about the operations of other service partners, (2) 
unanticipated impact on workload of partner agencies, (3) delays caused by county and 
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state rules on new positions, (4) lack of systems to coordinate data-sharing, and (5) 
difficulty integrating community-based victim services into justice agencies. 
Following these lessons, by setting clear goals, establishing leadership to direct 
operations, and formalizing communication and data-sharing, may prevent some issues 
with implementation from interfering with the innovation.  Even so, researchers may still 
encounter a variety of barriers, and guidance on planning innovations to accommodate 
such barriers would maximize program success, which may help to persuade the courts to 
be involved in more partnerships with researchers in the future. 
There is no framework or theory on the barriers to applying research evidence in a 
legal setting, but researchers in health care settings provide some guidance that may be 
applicable.  That is, researchers in health care settings are experiencing similar 
difficulties with translating their findings into practice.  Many of these researchers argue 
that the issue is lack of understanding by providers and other medical professionals, but 
the bigger issue is that changing practice is a slow process (Rogers, 2003), involving 
many variables, such as the organization’s resources, involvement by leadership, and 
mechanisms for feedback (Greenhalgh, Robert, MacFarlane, Bate, & Kyriakidou, 2004; 
Rycroft-Malone et al., 2002).  These issues explain why a well-designed, empirically 
validated program may not have the same results when introduced in a particular setting.  
They have tackled these issues by developing a different kind of research, which occurs 
after clinical research but before changed practice: implementation research. 
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Background on Implementation Science 
Implementation science and implementation research address the issues 
associated with applying research findings in practice.  Specifically, implementation 
researchers place their main focus on examining the barriers and facilitators to 
implementation and in many cases, making changes to address those issues (Werner, 
2004).  These changes may be within the system to remove barriers or introduce 
facilitators; alternatively, they may make changes to the program to allow it to work with 
pre-existing structures and processes, by working to identify what pieces of the 
intervention that are vital to program success and what components that can be 
customized to fit into a certain environment.  Though implementation research uses its 
own terminology and study designs, psychological researchers will be able to understand 
some of the underlying theory and components of these models and frameworks, in part 
because many are based on psychological theories, such as theories of behavior change 
(Bero et al., 1998). 
In addition, many theories are based on Rogers’s diffusion of innovations model 
(Glasgow, 2007), which grew out of Rogers’s research on diffusion of agricultural 
innovations and today can be used to explain a variety of innovations, from medical 
treatments to computers.  According to Rogers (2003), making an innovation part of 
regular practice is a phased process, in which individuals or organizations learn about the 
innovation (knowledge), evaluate the innovation (persuasion), decide whether to adopt or 
reject the innovation (decision), adopt the innovation (implementation), and seek 
evidence to reinforce their decision (confirmation).  Different people will adopt 
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innovations at different stages; some will be “early adopters”, who will evaluate and 
adopt an innovation when it is very new, and others will wait for more evidence and 
advice from others before implementation.  Furthermore, characteristics of the 
innovation, such as its relative advantage, complexity, and compatibility with current 
practice, will influence whether an innovation “catches on.” 
One framework that is frequently used by implementation researchers is PARIHS 
(Promoting Action on Research Implementation in Health Services), which states that 
implementation is a function of three general categories: (1) evidence, or the support for 
the effectiveness of an intervention or practice, including research evidence, experience 
of parties within the system, and local data; (2) context, which includes the organization’s 
readiness for change, culture, leadership, resources, and evaluation and feedback systems; 
and (3) facilitation, such as individuals who have been appointed to help or enable others 
to change their practice (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2002; Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004).  Any 
attempt to implement research evidence into practice should take these three categories 
into account, recognizing that any of these three categories, even evidence to support the 
intervention, is likely to vary by site.  Because PARIHS was designed to be used in health 
care settings, many terms are specific to the delivery of patient care.  The PARIHS 
model, however, could be useful in understanding implementation in a variety of 
systems, and can be used when planning an implementation intervention (Kitson et al., 
2008) or to evaluate an intervention that has already been implemented (Helfrich et al., 
2010).   
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RE-AIM is another potential framework that could be adopted by legal 
researchers.  RE-AIM stands for: (1) Reach, the proportion of people or organizations 
that would be able to apply the intervention; (2) Effectiveness, how well the intervention 
improves a given outcome; (3) Adoption, the proportion of eligible people or 
organizations that choose to implement the practice or intervention; (4) Implementation, 
the degree to which an intervention is delivered as it was intended; and (5) Maintenance, 
the sustainability of a practice or intervention (Glasgow, 2003).  Like PARIHS, RE-AIM 
is often applied in health care settings; PARIHS, however, identifies organizational 
factors influencing implementation, while RE-AIM is applicable to both organizations 
and individuals in understanding the factors that affect successful implementation 
(Glasgow, 2007).  For example, maintenance could refer to an organization’s ability to 
maintain a changed practice, but it could also refer to an individual’s ability to continue 
participating in a program.  The developers of RE-AIM suggest its use in designing an 
implementation, because it encourages individuals to consider more than the empirical 
evidence for a given intervention (effectiveness), such as factors that impact who may 
benefit from the intervention (Glasgow, Vogt, & Boles, 1999). 
Another model, developed through a systematic review of 495 sources about 
interventions in health care settings, is a complex account of how innovations are 
disseminated, diffused, and implemented, and the linkages between the service 
organization and other systems (Greenhalgh et al., 2004).  Though the authors note that 
their model is for use as a “memory aide for considering the different aspects of a 
complex situation and their many interactions” (p. 594), rather than a tool for planning 
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innovations, the model identifies many factors that should be taken into account when 
prescribing changes in complex systems.  Specifically, aside from noting the importance 
of strong communication, and discussion of meaning and mission between the change 
agency and the target agency, Greenhalgh et al.’s model includes several characteristics 
of the innovation itself that would influence how easily it is implemented, which reflect 
attributes identified by Rogers (2003).  Specifically, the innovation should be clearly 
effective and cost-effective; compatible with organizational norms and practices; simple 
to use; able to be experimented with, adopted in stages, or tailored; and result in 
observable changes. 
Finally, Lukas and colleagues (2007) developed an organizational model of 
transformation based on interviews conducted as part of a program evaluation on 
Pursuing Perfection, a program designed to introduce dramatic changes to health care.  
Though the models previously discussed all remark that outside forces (from beyond the 
organization of interest) are at play, Lukas et al.’s model notes that the impetus to 
changed practice often comes from outside the organization through policy or public 
pressure.  Leadership within the organization is placed at the top of the model, and 
promotes changes throughout the organization.  Pressure from outside and activity by 
leadership leads to the development of improvement initiatives, which transform the 
organization by (1) improving operations, (2) connecting multidisciplinary staff so they 
can work together to solve a tangible, important problem, and (3) building momentum for 
future innovations.  This model also notes the importance of context, including 
organizational mission, culture, resources, and current practice. 
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Though many of the frameworks, theories, and models just discussed were 
designed to be applied to health care settings, the basic components can be applied to a 
variety of situations, such as the legal system.  Additionally, health care settings and legal 
settings are similar in complexity and resource limitations.  Unlike health care settings, 
however, professionals in legal systems may not have as much opportunity to interact 
with professionals in other departments or locations.  Therefore, some implementation 
tactics that are useful in health care settings, such as local opinion leaders who educate 
other practitioners and encourage buy-in, may not translate to legal settings.  Even so, 
there may be ways for PTP researchers and psychologists to bridge the gap, and conduct 
research and interventions that could assist legal professionals in applying empirical 
evidence. 
Based on these theories, models, and frameworks, there are several important 
issues to consider when planning implementation of an intervention for the legal system.  
Organizational readiness for change is an important consideration for making changes 
within the legal system; because of the strength of precedent in directing practice, anyone 
attempting to make changes within the legal system should carefully assess readiness for 
change, which may vary depending on the type of change being suggested (Kitson et al., 
1998).  Greenhalgh and colleagues (2004) note that a receptive context should have: (1) 
leadership and vision, (2) good managerial relations, (3) a risk-taking climate, (4) clear 
goals and priorities, and (5) high-quality data capture.  Ensuring that these elements are 
sufficient for the proposed change will maximize the adoption and effectiveness of the 
intervention. 
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Limited resources, including financial, time, and human resources, should also 
be taken into account.  Any suggestions for change should not require large changes in 
resource allocation, but should be feasible using current resources.  In this case, 
suggesting minor changes to instruction wording or additional discussion of jury 
instructions may be manageable by most courts; suggesting greater use of change of 
venue or change of venire would be difficult, if not impossible, for many courts.  If 
additional physical or human resources are necessary, researchers should consider 
applying for outside funding.   
Similarly, any suggestions for changed practice should compliment current 
practice and not require a substantial change in time commitment.  Psychological 
researchers could work on developing accessible tools, along with clear advice on when 
to use these tools, that could be adopted by court officials or lawyers.  For example, 
because attitudes were found to have an influence on use of PTP information, a bank of 
attitude questions that could be used for a written measure or verbal questioning, could 
supplement current voir dire procedures and, provided clear guidance is given on how to 
use the results, may help these procedures to uncover more useful information. 
Influence from outside of the organization and attention from leadership are also 
essential in encouraging and planning innovations in the legal system.  Gaining the 
support from and working through oversight agencies may provide the additional push 
needed to get meaningful changes into practice.  For example, in the seven experiments 
discussed by Sand and Reiss (1985), the invitation and instructions came from leadership 
in their circuit; for this reason, judges may have been more willing to participate and may 
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have seen these suggested changes as more significant and justified.  Strong 
leadership is also important to organize communication and data-sharing among 
individuals or organizations, which will help to prevent delays or misunderstandings.  
An additional issue to consider is to recognize the expertise of legal professionals 
when making suggestions for improvement, particularly if a psychological researcher is 
organizing the implementation trial.  Psychologists have a strong understanding of human 
cognition and behavior, which is necessary to uncover bias.  At the same time, lawyers 
understand the law better than psychologists, and as such, are better equipped to question 
potential jurors in ways that are legally permissible.  Though in the famous O.J. Simpson 
homicide trial, trial consultants were appalled that prosecutor Marcia Clark chose to 
ignore her jury expert’s advice to keep African-American women off the jury, deciding 
instead to purposefully select African-American women to serve on the jury (Linder, 
2011), Clark may have also been concerned about violating statutes that prevent lawyers 
from targeting African-Americans for exclusion (Batson v. Kentucky, 1986).  That is, 
evidence that she was purposefully excluding African-American women from serving 
could have been challenged by the defense; if the judge agreed that the prosecution was 
targeting certain individuals, and decided to seat these individuals on the jury despite the 
prosecution’s request that they be excluded, these jurors could have begun hearing the 
trial believing the prosecutor was “against them.”  Therefore, Clark’s decision may have 
been strategic, to get these individuals to believe she was “on their side”, though, focus 
groups with African-American women suggest that jurors’ opinion of her may not have 
been positive (Linder, 2011). 
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Bridging the Gap 
It is important to keep in mind that any proposed changes to a system as large and 
complex as our legal system should work with the pre-existing structures and correct the 
problem with the smallest change in practice possible.  More research is needed to 
determine whether a change is feasible, and these studies should take place in actual legal 
settings.  After lab studies showing whether a change affects the outcome, the next step is 
to conduct studies with the cooperation of a small number of courtrooms.   
As part of these small studies, data should be collected on not only the outcome, 
but any barriers, facilitators, and unintended consequences (both positive and negative).  
These results would provide information on how feasible it is to implement this change 
into practice, and direction on how to alter the program or practice in a particular setting 
so that it works with, not against, current practice.  As suggested by Cissner and Farole 
(2011), innovations should be designed in such a way to allow changes to be made when 
needed, by providing direction on how the practice could be changed if needed and 
providing a mechanism for feedback.  Allowing for tailoring should not only make legal 
professionals more open to implementing the changes; it will also help to allay any 
concerns about adverse outcomes that could lead to mistrials or appeals. 
Working Together to Move Forward 
For many years, psychological researchers have been examining the legal setting 
and legal professionals, and providing evidence on issues with current practice.  From 
Sigmund Freud telling Austrian judges that their unconscious processes may bias their 
decisions (Bersoff, 1986) to criticism of jury selection in death penalty cases (Lynch, 
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2009), there are countless examples of psychologists and experts from related fields 
insisting that something needs to change with little guidance on what to do instead or, 
when changes are suggested, how to merge them with current practice.  There are a few 
cases where these experts have stepped in, explained the program in language legal 
professionals can understand, and provided specific instructions and assistance on 
making the change work in a particular setting.  If researchers want to effect real change 
in the legal system, we must be willing to meet the legal system halfway, and take this 
hands-on approach more frequently.  By showing that we understand the burdens placed 
on legal professionals, or at the very least, making efforts to learn about the processes 
that may hinder improvements to practice, we will be able to work together to change 
practice for the better. 
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Some PTP researchers have examined characteristics of the crime.  The 
heinousness of the description has been found to affect verdicts.  Though they did not 
compare two different crimes, Hoiberg and Stires (1973) manipulated whether the PTP 
contained a detailed description of a murder-rape or gave a short description of the 
murder without mentioning the rape.  All participants learned about the sexual nature of 
the crime at the trial, but female participants who received the detailed description in PTP 
rated the defendant as more guilty after the trial. 
Deitz and Sissman (1984), in addition to questioning respondents about a specific 
case, asked various questions about crime in general.  Participants rated the seriousness 
of various crimes and estimated the number of defendants accused of each crime that 
were actually guilty.  Though there were no differences in estimates across the different 
crimes, there were differences in the perceived seriousness of crimes on a scale of 1 to 
10.  Speeding and shoplifting received the lowest ratings.  Credit card theft, possession of 
illegal drugs, and burglary received ratings just above the scale midpoint.  The most 
serious crimes were generally crimes against people, such as kidnapping, rape, and 
murder.  The one exception was distribution of cocaine. 
It is likely that different crimes have different effects on reactions to defendants 
because of the emotions produced by such crimes.  According to Ajzen and Sexton 
(1999) affective responses are, for the most part, independent from the cognitive elements 
involved in forming an attitude.  These responses, however, can influence cognition in 
certain situations.  For instance, the affective-primacy hypothesis states that affect 
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influences evaluations of novel stimuli if the person is unaware of the change in or source 
of the affect.   
Baumeister, DeWall, and Zhang (2007) differentiate between affect and emotions.  
Affect is an automatic, predominantly unconscious reaction that guides behavior.  
Emotion is the more deliberate, conscious experience, which occurs more slowly and is 
less helpful in guiding behavior.  One could think of the latter as what non-psychologists 
mean when they discuss emotion, whereas the former is more similar to mood.  Certain 
crimes may affect decision making by eliciting sudden reactions.  The person may not 
know the cause of his or her affect or mood, and may attribute it to something else 
(Gasper & Isbell, 2007), such as the defendant.  This may then cause him or her to 
evaluate the defendant more negatively and as more likely to be guilty. 
In addition, affect can influence the type of information seen as relevant (Gasper 
& Isbell, 2007), so that when a person is in a negative mood, he or she is more able to 
remember negative information.  This would mean that participants receiving a crime that 
elicits a more negative mood would be more likely to recall negative PTP information, 
and therefore, more likely to use such information.  Though participants with strong 
attitudes toward a given piece of information would likely remember, and use, such 
information regardless of mood, participants with weaker attitudes may also be likely to 
use such information when in a negative mood. 
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This study is about decision making in a court case. It is being conducted by Sara M. 
House for a dissertation under the supervision of Linda Heath in the Department of 
Psychology at Loyola University of Chicago. 
 
You are being asked to participate because you are eligible for jury service. You must be 
at least 18 years of age to participate. 
 
If you agree to be in the study, you will be asked to: 
 Read an abbreviated trial transcript. 
 Render a verdict and answer questions about your reactions to the case. 
 
There are no foreseeable risks involved in participating in this research beyond those 
experienced in everyday life. There are no direct benefits to you from participation, but 
the results will be helpful in understanding reactions to trials. 
 
Your results will be completely confidential. Your name will not be attached to any 
materials, and only the researcher will have access to the data. 
 
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you do not want to be in this study, you do not 
have to participate. Even if you decide to participate, you are free not to answer any 
question or to withdraw from participation at any time without penalty. 
 
If you have questions about this research study, please feel free to contact Sara M. House 
at shouse1@luc.edu or the faculty sponsor, Linda Heath, at lheath@luc.edu. 
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the 
Loyola University Office of Research Services at (773) 508-2689. 
 
By completing the survey you are agreeing to participate in the research. 
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You have been participating in a study on jury decision making.  The purpose of this 
study is to find a case of moderate strength for use in future research.   
You received one of six versions of the case, each containing different combinations of 
evidence.  In addition, some of you received a case where the victim was a middle-aged 
man, and some of you received a case where the victim was an elderly woman.  It is 
expected that participants reading a case with an elderly female victim will experience 
more negative emotion.  Finally, some of you completed this study online, and some of 
you completed the study in a classroom; the purpose is to determine if the way in which 
you completed the study affects your reactions to the case. 
This research is ongoing, so please do not discuss the study with anyone.  If you have any 
questions or would like to receive a copy of the results of this study, please contact Sara 
House at shouse1@luc.edu. 
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Predictor B SE Wald df p 
Constant -1.386 0.791 3.075 1 0.080
Location 0.000 1.118 0.000 1 1.000
Overall Version   3.178 5 0.673
Version dummy 1 0.539 1.049 0.264 1 0.608 
Version dummy 2 0.000 1.118 0.000 1 1.000 
Version dummy 3 0.405 1.041 0.152 1 0.697 
Version dummy 4 1.386 1.012 1.875 1 0.171 
Version dummy 5 0.000 1.118 0.000 1 1.000 
Victim 0.981 1.021 0.924 1 0.337
Overall Location X Version   7.520 5 0.185
Loc X Version dummy 1 -1.551 1.678 0.853 1 0.356 
Loc X Version dummy 2 1.792 1.514 1.401 1 0.237 
Loc X Version dummy 3 0.644 1.432 0.202 1 0.653 
Loc X Version dummy 4 -1.099 1.522 0.521 1 0.470 
Loc X Version dummy 5 1.386 1.508 0.845 1 0.358 
Overall Victim X Version   9.169 5 0.103
Vic X Version dummy 1 -1.520 1.464 1.078 1 0.299 
Vic X Version dummy 2 -38.466 67110000.0 0.000 1 1.000 
Vic X Version dummy 3 -1.386 1.458 0.904 1 0.342 
Vic X Version dummy 4 -2.367 1.438 2.711 1 0.100 
Vic X Version dummy 5 1.792 1.514 1.401 1 0.237 
Victim X Location -1.386 1.683 0.678 1 0.410
Overall Victim X Location X Version   11.896 5 0.036
Vic X Location X Version dummy 1 2.937 2.377 1.526 1 0.217 
Vic X Location X Version dummy 2 36.962 67110000.0 0.000 1 1.000 
Vic X Location X Version dummy 3 1.281 2.176 0.346 1 0.556 
Vic X Location X Version dummy 4 3.312 2.218 2.230 1 0.135 
Vic X Location X Version dummy 5 -3.584 2.365 2.295 1 0.130 
Notes. Loc = Location; Vic = Victim. 
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This article appeared in the media about this case. 
www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-washington-case-tuesdayaug18,0,6895496.story 
chicagotribune.com 
Arrest made in Washington case 
By Deborah Flores 
Tribute reporter 
An arrest has been made in the recent battery of Joseph Washington, a 45-year-old 
Chicago resident. 
Mr. Washington awoke from a nap to find a man in his home on the morning of August 
15th.  The man attacked Mr. Washington, then left.  Mr. Washington was later taken to 
the hospital and treated for a cut on his cheek and a broken rib. 
On Monday, police arrested Brian Campbell, 35, a former employee of Jesse 
Washington, the victim’s brother.  Campbell is facing an aggravated battery charge. 
[Participants in the PTP conditions received one of the following additional statements:  
According to a police source, the suspect has confessed to the crime. 
According to a police source, the suspect has been convicted of a similar crime in the 
past. 
According to a police source, the suspect did not cooperate during arrest.] 
Campbell posted bond and is due in court later this week.  Campbell’s attorney, Richard 
Bennett, has stated that his client will plead not guilty. 
dflores@tribune.com 
Copyright © 2009, Chicago Tribune 
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Voir Dire Questionnaire 
You are now going to serve as a juror on the case you just read about.  Before reading the 
trial transcript, please complete the following questionnaire, which is part of a process 
called ‘voir dire’.  Attorneys often use these questionnaires to learn more about potential 
jurors. 
 
 Gender: (circle one) Male Female 
 How old are you? ___________ 
 Year in School (circle one): Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior 
 Race: (circle one)   
African-American/Black  
Asian-American  
Caucasian  
Hispanic/Latino  
Other  
Prefer not to answer 
 Have you ever served on a jury before? Yes No 
Attorneys also want to know about potential jurors’ views of the legal system.  Read each 
statement and indicate how much you agree with it. 
Note: Questions are not presented here in the same order as they were received by 
participants; treatment attitude questions were intermingled with other questions to 
decrease participant suspicion. 
 
Questions Received by All Participants: 
 
1. Unfair treatment of underprivileged groups and classes is the chief cause of crime. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
2. Too many obviously guilty persons escape punishment because of legal 
technicalities. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
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3. Evidence illegally obtained should be admissible in court if such evidence is the 
only way to obtain a conviction. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
4. Search warrants should clearly specify the person or things to be seized. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
5. No one should be convicted of a crime on the basis of circumstantial evidence, no 
matter how strong such evidence is. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
6. There is no need in a criminal case for the accused to prove his innocence beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
7. Wiretapping by anyone and for any reason should be completely illegal. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
8. Defendants in a criminal case should be required to take the witness stand. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
9. All too often, minority group members do not get fair trials 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
10. Because of the oppression and persecution minority group members suffer, they 
deserve leniency and special treatment in the courts. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
11. Citizens need to be protected against excess police power as well as against 
criminals. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
12. It is better for society that several guilty men be freed than one innocent one 
wrongfully imprisoned. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
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13. Accused persons should be required to take lie detector tests. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
14. When there is a “hung” jury in a criminal case, the defendant should always be 
free and the indictment dismissed. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
15. A society with true freedom and equality for all would have very little crime. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
16. It is moral and ethical for a lawyer to represent a defendant 
in a criminal case even when he believes his client is guilty. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
17. Police should be allowed to arrest and question suspicious-looking persons to 
determine whether they have been up to something illegal. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
18. The law coddles criminals to the detriment of society. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
19. The freedom of society is endangered as much by overzealous law enforcement as 
by the acts of individual criminals. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
20. In the long run, liberty is more important than order. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
21. Upstanding citizens have nothing to fear from the police. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
22. The punishments given to criminals accurately reflect the crimes they have 
committed. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
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23. The skills of lawyers determine the verdict more than the truth. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
24. Too many criminals are out on parole. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
25. Police brutality is more common than people think. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
26. If a defendant has enough money he or she will be able to buy an acquittal. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
27. As a group, judges are more impartial and fair than people in general. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
28. Juries base their decisions only on the evidence given in court. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
29. Too many criminals are let free because of prison overcrowding. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
30. Court-appointed attorneys and public defenders do as good a job as personally 
hired attorneys. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
31. Police will often keep a suspect in custody, even when they don’t have any firm 
evidence against him. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
32. Most prosecuting attorneys have a strong sadistic streak. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
Confession Questions: 
33. When a suspect confesses to the police, he or she does so voluntarily. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
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34. Anyone who confesses to a crime should be automatically found guilty and 
sentenced. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
Prior Record Questions: 
35. When determining a person’s guilt or innocence, the existence of a prior arrest 
record should not be considered. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
36. If a suspect has committed a crime once, chances are he’ll do it again. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
Resisting Arrest Questions: 
37. Any person who resists arrest has committed a crime. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
38. People who run from the police must have something to hide. 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
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Trial Transcript  
Note: This is an abbreviated transcript, not a complete transcript.  You will read statements 
by the attorneys and questioning of key witnesses.  Some witnesses have been omitted.  After 
reading this transcript, you will be asked to determine a verdict, and answer some questions 
about your reactions to the case.  
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 THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentleman.  We are in open court with counsel and 
the defendant, and we have the jury present.  The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty to 
the charge of aggravated battery.  
THE COURT: The next part of the trial involves allowing the parties, if they wish to do so, to 
make an opening statement.  The purpose of an opening statement is to provide you with a 
brief outline as to what the parties anticipate the evidence will show during the course of the 
trial.  We start with the State.  
THE COURT: I think we are ready to begin, Mr. Russell.  
MR. RUSSELL: Thank you.    
On the morning of August 15th, Joseph Washington saw his family off to work.  Around 
10:00 AM, he laid down to take a nap, and awoke shortly after 11:00AM to find a man in his 
home.  This man proceeded to attack Mr. Washington, by pushing him down, and kicking 
him twice in the ribs.  This caused Mr. Washington to sustain many injuries, including 
bruises, a cut on the cheek, and a broken rib.  You will hear from Mr. Washington that he 
feared the attacker might intend to kill him.  Then you will hear from Mr. Washington that he 
identified Brian Campbell as the man who attacked him.  You will hear from a neighbor who 
recalled seeing the defendant’s car in the area shortly before the attack and another neighbor 
who saw the same car in front of the Washington home.  You will hear about a wooden case 
recovered from the defendant’s home that resembles a case taken from the Washington home 
on the day of the attack.  Finally, you will hear that the defendant was a former employee of 
Mr. Washington’s brother, Jesse Washington, and that the defendant had been recently fired 
for poor performance.  And you will hear that the defendant told Jesse Washington, “You’ll 
be sorry for this” after he was fired.   
This is the reason for the attack.  It is entirely about revenge.  Brian Campbell came into 
Joseph Washington’s home and attacked him to get even with his former boss.  Perhaps this 
was not his original plan when he entered the home.  Maybe he wanted to steal something or 
ransack the place.  But when he found Joseph asleep, his plans changed.  He thought, “This is 
even better.  This will definitely make Jesse Washington sorry.”  The defense will try to 
convince you that someone else is responsible for brutally attacking Joseph.  Other than the 
case belonging to Jesse Washington, nothing was taken.  The Washingtons have no enemies.  
The only person with a grudge, and who threatened Jesse Washington, is in this courtroom 
today.  We will show you that Brian Campbell is guilty of this brutal crime.  
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, that completes the first opening statement.  The next 
one is by Mr. Bennett, for the defense.  
MR. BENNETT: Thank you, your honor.  
Mr. Russell thinks that because Mr. Washington identified my client in a police lineup, my 
client must be guilty.  He leaves out the fact that Mr. Washington wears glasses, which he 
was not wearing during the attack.  Mr. Washington is does not see well without those 
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glasses.  It would be difficult, if not impossible, for him to actually be able to see his attacker.  
And yet, Mr. Washington identifies my client.  Why?  Not because he is guilty, but because 
Mr. Washington had met my client and knew what he looked like.  Because Jesse 
Washington had mentioned that my client was recently fired and may retaliate.  Mr. 
Washington’s identification of my client means nothing.   
We will show that my client has an alibi for the time of the attack.  The eyewitness who saw 
my client’s car drive by her home is correct.  My client was in the area, because his friend 
lives in the area.  Once again, this identification means nothing.  In fact, every piece of 
evidence the prosecution will show you can easily be explained.  My client is not guilty of 
this crime.  And that is what we are going to show you.   
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THE COURT: We have concluded opening statements.  We will now move on to the taking 
of evidence.  The State is ready to call their first witness.  
MR. RUSSELL: The State calls Joseph Washington to the stand.  
BY MR. RUSSELL: Good morning.  Mr. Washington, please state your name and 
age for the record.  
A. Joseph Washington.  45.  
Q. Can you please describe what happened on the morning of August 15th?  
A. Yes.  I woke up earlier than usual, around 6:00AM.  I had some work to do in my garage, 
so I started on that.  About 7:30 AM, my brother and daughter left for work.  I saw them off, 
and went back to the garage.  About 10, I was feeling pretty sleepy, and I decided to take a 
nap.  I woke up maybe an hour later, and thought I heard footsteps in my room.  I figured it 
was my brother, come home early.  I looked up and there was a man in my room, looking at 
me.  He was too tall to be my brother.  I stood up, but the man pushed me down on the floor.  
It knocked the wind out of me.  I tried to get up, but he kicked me in the side.  That hurt a lot 
more than being pushed down. He kicked me again.  I remember lying there, wondering what 
would happen next.  I was afraid he was going to kill me.  He was bigger than me, and I 
didn’t know if he had a gun or something.  I looked around the room for something to fight 
back with, but I looked up and he was gone.  I laid there for a while.  I’m not sure how long.  
I was trying to build up strength to get to the phone.  I couldn’t stand, so I crawled to the 
phone and called my brother.  I told him a man had attacked me.  He was tall, maybe 5’11.  I 
said, “I think it was Brian”.  My brother was quiet for a second and then said, “Are you 
sure?”  And I said, “Yes.”  
Q. Why did you call your brother instead of the police?  
A. When I reached up for the phone, I felt this sharp pain where he kicked me.  I couldn’t 
stand up, and reaching was so painful.  I wanted to dial quickly, and my brother’s number is 
on speed dial, so I only had to hit one button.  I guess, looking back, I should have called the 
police first, but at the time, I was in such pain, I don’t think I was thinking clearly.  My 
brother asked if I had called the police, and I said no, so he called.  
Q. What happened next?  
A. The police arrived.  And my brother.  I didn’t realize until then that my cheek was cut and 
I was bleeding.  They took me to the hospital for stitches and x-rays.  I found out my rib was 
broken, which explains the pain.  I told the police what happened, and that Brian Campbell 
was my attacker.  A couple of days later, they called me in for a lineup.  
Q. And that’s when you identified Brian Campbell?  
A. Yes.  
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Q. How do you think he got into your home?  
A: I’m not sure.  The police said there were no broken windows or anything, but I know I 
didn’t leave any doors open or unlocked.  The front door was unlocked when the police 
arrived, but I remember locking it.  
MR. RUSSELL: Thank you.  No further questions.  
THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, you may cross-examine.  
MR. BENNETT: Thank you, your honor.  
BY MR. BENNETT: Mr. Washington, would you mind removing your glasses?  
A. No, I don’t mind.  
Q. How many fingers am I holding up?  
A. I don’t know.  Three?  
Q. May I approach the witness, your honor?  
THE COURT: You may.  
Q. Okay, this is about five feet away.  How about now?  
A. I think four.  
Q. You’re right.  How close was the attacker to you?  
A. Maybe a foot or so away.  
Q. How difficult was it for you to see my hand?  
A. A little difficult, I guess.  
Q. You had to squint or strain?  
A. A little.  
Q. But you’re confident that Mr. Campbell was your attacker?  
A. Yes.    
Q. Why?  
A. I’ve met Brian before.  I remember how tall he was and the color of his hair. I recognized 
that.  
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Q. Thank you.  You can put your glasses back on.  You said you told your brother you 
thought it was Brian.  You weren’t sure it was him?  
A. I was pretty sure it was Brian who attacked me before that.  
Q. Just pretty sure?  
A. I was certain it was him.  Who else could it be?  
Q. How come you didn’t say, “Brian attacked me” first?  You described the attacker to your 
brother instead before identifying him, right?  
A. Yes.  I don’t know.  I guess I wasn’t thinking too clearly.  
MR. BENNETT: Thank you, Ms. Washington.  No further questions.  
MR. RUSSELL: The State calls Jesse Washington.  
BY MR. RUSSELL: Can you state your name and age for the record?  
A. Jesse Washington, 58.  
Q. What do you do for a living?  
A. I own a body shop.  
Q. Did Mr. Campbell ever work for you?  
A. Yes, he started in March of last year.  
Q. And when did Mr. Campbell stop working for you?  
A. When I fired him in late July.  
Q. Why did you fire him?  
A. He was always goofing off with another employee.  Not getting anything done.  
Customers were complaining that their cars took too long.  It was bad for my business.  
Q. Who was that other employee?  
A. Ralph Turner.  Brian was a good worker until I hired Ralph.  I think I hired him in early 
July.  They spent all of their time goofing around.  I talked to them about it.  But that didn’t 
seem to work, so I fired Ralph because I remembered Brian was fine until Ralph showed up.  
But after Ralph was gone, Brian was still not getting work done.  He spent a lot of time on his 
phone, and he called in maybe three times in a couple of weeks.  I talked to him about, but it 
didn’t stop.  So I fired him too.  
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Q. Did Brian get angry?  
A. Yes, he punched a wall.  And said, “You can’t do this.”  I told him sorry, but I’d given 
him too many chances.  And he said, “You’ll be sorry for this.”   
Q. He threatened you?  
A. Yes.  He was really angry.  I asked him what he meant by that, but he just walked away.  
Q. Did you worry that he might try to hurt you?  
A. A little.  He was a big guy.  I mean, not just tall, but strong.  I mentioned something to my 
brother that night.  Not to let him in if he comes by.  He seemed worried.  
Q. You live with your brother?  
A. Not today.  
Q. Did you in August of last year?  
A. Yeah, I moved in early last year, because I doing some major work on my house.  
Q. Did Mr. Campbell know where you were living?  
A. Yes.  We had him over once in May.  We had everyone who works for me over for a 
barbecue.  
Q. And your brother met Brian Campbell then?  
A. I think it was then.  He’s been by the shop before, so maybe he met him then.  He’s talked 
to him a couple of times.  
Q. The day your brother called, did you suggest Brian Campbell was the attacker?  
A. No.  Joseph called and said he’d been attacked, and he thought it was Brian.  I only asked 
if he was sure.  And he said, “Yes.”  I never said it was Brian.  Or made him think it was 
Brian.  
Q. And when you got home, was anything missing?  
A. I have a wooden box on a bookshelf in the hallway.  By my brother’s room.  It had some 
personal things in it.  Pictures, letters, a set of keys to my house.  I had to change all the 
locks.  
Q.  Why would Brian take that?  
MR. BENNETT: Objection, your honor.  
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MR. RUSSELL: I’ll rephrase.  Why do you think Joseph’s attacker took that?  
A. Maybe he wanted the keys to my place.  The letters had my address.  Maybe he wanted to 
break into my house.  
Q. Brian Campbell didn’t know where you lived?  
A. No, I wasn’t living there when Brian was working for me.  I never had a reason to tell him 
where my house was.  
MR. RUSSELL: Thank you.  Those are all my questions.  
BY MR. BENNETT: You’ve never found that missing case?  
A. I told the police it wasn’t on the shelf when we were upstairs helping Joseph.  Later on, I 
looked around and didn’t find it, so I told the police it had been stolen.  When they arrested 
Brian, and called us down to the station for the lineup, they showed me the case they found in 
Brian’s house.  It looked like mine, but there was nothing inside.  
Q. Was there anything identifiable about the case?  Any marks or writing?  
A. No writing.  I remembered the size and color.  And the closure.  The case they found was 
the same.  
Q. And they didn’t find any of the pictures of keys at Mr. Campbell’s place?  
A. No, I guess he threw them away.  
Q. But it’s possible he never had your case?  
A. I guess.  It looked exactly the same to me.  
Q. Was this case bought from a special store?  
A. No, some department store I think.  My brother got it for me.  
Q. So it was something Mr. Campbell could have bought on his own?  
A. Yeah.  
Q. You said that Mr. Campbell could have thrown away your pictures and keys.  Why would 
he keep the case?  
A. I don’t know.  Maybe he didn’t throw them away.  Maybe he hid them.  
Q. Somewhere the police didn’t look?  Do you know where they searched?  
A. His home.  His car, I think.  
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Q. And found nothing?  
MR. RUSSELL: Objection, your honor.  The witness has already said the police didn’t find 
the objects from the case.  
THE COURT: Sustained.    
Q. Was your home ever broken into?  
A. No.  
Q. When he punched the wall, about how hard would you say?  
A. I don’t know.  Pretty hard I think.  
Q. Did he leave a dent or a hole?  
A. No.  
Q. Have you ever punched something when you felt angry or frustrated?  
A. Probably.  
MR. BENNETT: No more questions, your honor.  
MR. RUSSELL: The State calls Laura Phillips.  
BY MR. RUSSELL: How do you know Joseph Washington?  
A. He’s my neighbor.  
Q. Do you know the defendant?  
A. No, I don’t.  
Q. So, what made you call police that day?  
A. I heard Joseph had been attacked at home, and they thought the person drove an old white 
Ford truck.  
Q. And you saw this truck?  
A. Yes.  I was outside, in my front yard, gardening.  And I saw that car drive by.    
Q. Was there anything special that made you remember that car?  
A. There’s not a lot of traffic on my street, and it was a quiet morning, and the car was really 
loud.  Like there was no muffler.  It made me look up and watch it drive by.  
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Q. What time did you see the defendant’s car?  
A. It was around 11:00 in the morning.  
MR. RUSSELL: Let me remind the court that shortly after 11:00 AM, the victim was 
attacked.  
Q. Did it appear that the defendant was driving toward the victim’s home?  
MR. BENNETT: Objection, your honor.  
THE COURT: Sustained.  
Q. Was the defendant driving in the direction of the victim’s home?  
A. Yes.  
MR. RUSSELL: Nothing further, your honor.  
THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, you may cross-examine.  
BY MR. BENNETT: Is Mr. Washington’s home the only one in the direction my 
client was driving?  
A. Well, no.  Of course not.  
Q. So my client could have been driving any number of places after driving by your house?  
MR. RUSSELL: Objection, your honor.    
MR. BENNETT: Your honor, I’m not asking the witness if Mr. Campbell was driving 
somewhere else.  Just that he could have been going anywhere, not necessarily the 
Washington home.  
THE COURT: I’ll allow it.  The witness may answer.  
A. There’s a main street that way, so he could have been heading there.  
MR. BENNETT: Thank you.  Nothing further.  
MR. RUSSELL: The State calls Sean Jones.  
BY MR. RUSSELL: How do you know Joseph Washington?  
A. I live across the street.  
Q. What do you remember about the morning of August 15th?  
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A. I remember seeing Joseph working in his garage earlier in the day.  I was getting into my 
car to go to my office.  About 11:00 AM, I came back home because I forgot an important 
file.  As I was turning into my driveway, I noticed a white truck parked in front of Joseph’s 
house.  
Q. Did this seem strange to you?  
A. I wasn’t sure who the car belonged to, but I figured Joseph or someone had company.  I 
went inside to find the file.  
Q. Was the truck there when you came back out?  
A. I don’t remember seeing it, no.  
Q. When did you come back out?  
A. Maybe 10 minutes later.  I didn’t really think anything of it until I heard about the attack.  
I mentioned to the police that I’d never seen that white truck before that day.  
MR. RUSSELL: Thank you.  Nothing further.  
BY MR. BENNETT: You never heard the car leave?  
A. I thought I heard a loud noise, like a loud car or a motorcycle while I was inside my 
house.  I remember thinking it was strange to hear such a loud car.  We live in a pretty quiet 
neighborhood.  
Q. When did you hear the noise?  
A. I think it was a few minutes after I got home.  I don’t remember for sure.  
Q. The truck you saw.  Was it a Ford?  
A. It might have been.  I didn’t really pay attention.  
Q. You mentioned that Joseph or someone maybe had company.  What did you mean by 
that?  
A. Well, the truck wasn’t directly in front of Joseph’s house.  It was kind of in between his 
house and his next-door neighbor, Mr. Turner’s house.    
Q. So you don’t know if the driver of the truck was in the Washington home?  
A. No, I don’t.  
MR. BENNETT: Thank you.  No further questions.  
MR. RUSSELL: Your honor, The State rests.  
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THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Russell.  Mr. Bennett, you may call your first witness.  
MR. BENNETT: The defense calls Ralph Taylor to the stand.  
BY MR. BENNETT: Was Mr. Campbell with you on the day Joseph Washington 
was attacked?  
A. Yeah.  We were watching TV at my apartment.  
Q. You live near Mr. Washington?  
A. Just a few blocks.  
Q. So, when Mrs. Phillips saw my client driving, he was probably heading to your 
apartment?  
MR. RUSSELL: Objection, your honor.  
MR. BENNETT: I’ll withdraw that question, your honor.  About what time did my client 
arrive at your apartment?  
A. It was a little after 11:00 AM.  
Q. And how long did he stay?  
A. A couple of hours.  
Q. At any time during his stay, did he mention anything to you about Jesse Washington?  
A. No.  I think he was over being fired.  We were looking for new jobs.  We talked about 
where we’d like to work next.  He seemed excited about starting a new job.  
MR. BENNETT: Thank you.  Nothing further.  
 BY MR. RUSSELL: You are also a former employee of Jesse Washington?  
A. Yes, that’s correct.  
Q. And you were laid off shortly before the defendant?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Did it make you angry at Jesse Washington?  
A. Yeah, I guess so.  Really, I was more surprised and upset, maybe a little angry.  
Q. And if something happened to one of Jesse Washington’s loved ones, you would do what 
you could to help, even lie?  
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MR. BENNETT: Objection, your honor.  
MR. RUSSELL: Withdrawn, your honor.    
Q. About how long would it take to get from Mr. Washington’s home to your apartment?  
A. I don’t know.  5 minutes maybe.  
Q. So it’s possible that Brian Campbell stopped there before coming to your place?  
A. I don’t think he would have gone there.  Is it possible?  I don’t know.  Maybe.  
Q. Did anyone else see you and Mr. Campbell together?  
A. I told my sister he was coming over, but no one else was there while we were watching 
TV.  
MR. RUSSELL: No further questions.  
MR. BENNETT: Redirect, your honor?  
THE COURT: Proceed.  
BY MR. BENNETT: Mr. Russell is suggesting that you’re lying about my client 
being with  you at the time of the attack.  Are you lying?  
A. Absolutely not.  Brian is my friend, but I would never lie about something like this.  
MR. BENNETT: Thank you.  No further questions, your honor.  The defense rests.  
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THE COURT: We will now hear closing arguments.  Once again, we will begin with the 
State.  
MR. RUSSELL: The defense would have you believe that this case is entirely about 
eyewitness testimony.  Specifically Mr. Washington’s testimony that Brian Campbell was his 
attacker.  But this case is about more than that.  There are not one, but three witnesses, and 
the other two provide information that shows Mr. Campbell was in the area, and was in front 
of Mr. Washington’s house.  But this case is still about more than that.  Mr. Bennett would 
have you believe that Jesse and Joseph Washington were quick to believe Mr. Campbell was 
the attacker because of his recent firing.  So quick to believe this that they ignored the 
possibility that someone else was the attacker.  But they believed this because Mr. Campbell 
threatened Jesse Washington.  He worried Jesse Washington enough for him to tell his 
brother.  For him to warn that Mr. Campbell might retaliate, and “Don’t let him in if he 
comes by.”  It seems that they were perfectly warranted in believing that Mr. Campbell was 
the attacker.  That combined with the eyewitnesses is enough to show Mr. Campbell is guilty.  
The defense even admits that Mrs. Phillips saw Brian Campbell’s car drive by shortly before 
Joseph Washington was attacked.  Ralph Taylor claims that Brian Campbell was with him 
watching TV at that time, but Ralph Taylor is also a former employee of Jesse Washington, 
who was fired for the same reason as Brian Campbell.  Even if Mr. Taylor isn’t lying for 
Brian Campbell, the attack took a few minutes.  Brian Campbell could have easily driven to 
Mr. Taylor’s afterward and still have arrived shortly after 11:00 AM.    
Ralph Taylor suggests that Brian Campbell was at peace with his firing.  That he had “gotten 
over it.”  Of course he was at peace.  He had just gotten his revenge.  Perhaps he had more 
planned when he took those keys, but maybe he decided, “This is enough.  Time to move 
on.”  His revenge was at the expense of Joseph Washington’s health, his feeling of safety in 
his own home.  Brian Campbell’s cruelty cannot go unpunished.  Find him guilty of this 
crime.  
THE COURT: We will now hear the defense’s closing argument.  
MR. BENNETT: Joseph Washington was brutally attacked.  There is no question about that.  
And my client and I hope that the police catch the man who attacked him.  But my client was 
not that man.  We have shown that my client was with another person at the time of the 
attack.  A witness saw my client’s car in the area, but that’s because my client was driving to 
Ralph Taylor’s apartment.  We have also shown that Joseph Washington was not wearing his 
glasses at the time of the attack, and did not clearly see his attacker’s face.  He never heard 
the attacker’s voice.  And when he told his brother about the attack, he started by describing 
the attacker.  He said, “A man who was 5’11” attacked me”, and it was only after that Mr. 
Washington identified the attacker as my client.  
The wooden case found in my client’s home was similar to one owned by Jesse Washington.  
But he admitted that the case was plain and unornamented, and could have been purchased 
from many stores.  The case taken from Joseph’s home contained personal objects, none of 
which were found in the case taken from my client’s home.  The State has not, and cannot, 
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prove that the case in the courtroom today is the one from Joseph’s home. Brian Campbell 
was upset about being fired from his job.  Anyone would be upset about that.  Perhaps he said 
something he now regrets.  That does not mean he attacked someone.  
Mr. Russell thinks that my client’s friend, Ralph Taylor is lying.  Unfortunately, there’s 
no way I can prove that his friend isn’t lying, except that he says he isn’t.  You’ll just 
have to take his word for it.  But if you disbelieve Mr. Taylor, it’s because you’re taking 
Mr. Washington’s word for it.  The only evidence the state has that my client attacked 
Mr. Washington is that Mr. Washington says so.  And Mr. Washington is mistaken.    
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THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you have heard all of the evidence.  It is my 
duty to instruct you on the law.  
First, you must determine what facts have been proved from the evidence received in the trial 
and not from any other source 
[Added in specific instructions: “, such as the media.”] 
[Added in strong instructions: “, such as the media.  Such outside information can be 
unreliable.”] 
Second, you must apply the law that I state to you to the facts as you determine them, and in 
this way arrive at your verdict, even if you don’t agree with the law.  
You must not be influenced by pity for or prejudice against a defendant.  You must not be 
influenced by sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public 
feeling.  
Statements made by the attorneys are not evidence.  Evidence is either direct or 
circumstantial.  Direct evidence is evidence that directly proves a fact.  Circumstantial 
evidence is the proof of facts or circumstances which give rise to a reasonable inference of 
other facts which tend to show the guilt or innocence of the defendant.  Circumstantial 
evidence should be considered by you together with all the other evidence in the case in 
arriving at your verdict.  
The defendant’s guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  In other words, before an 
inference essential to establish guilt may be found to have been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, each fact of circumstances on which the inference necessarily rests must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Motive is not an element of the crime charged and need not be shown.   
A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved.  The 
State has the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Reasonable 
doubt is defined as the following: it is not a mere possible doubt, because everything relating 
to human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.  It is that state of the case 
which, after the entire comparison and consideration of evidence, leaves the minds of the 
jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the 
charge.  
In the crime charged, aggravated battery causing great bodily harm, there must exist severe or 
aggravated bodily injury to the victim, involving apparent broken bones, loss of teeth, 
possible internal injuries, severe laceration, or loss of consciousness.  
To sustain the charge of aggravated battery causing great bodily harm, the State must prove 
the following propositions:  
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First: That the defendant intentionally engaged in conduct which caused Joseph 
Washington severe or aggravated bodily injury.  
Second: That the bodily injury involved apparent broken bones, loss of teeth, possible 
internal injuries, severe laceration, or loss of consciousness.  
 If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that these propositions have been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty.  
 If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that these propositions have not 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty. 
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Please provide a verdict and rating of the defendant’s guilt.  Answer both questions. 
 
 
 
 
1. As a juror in this case, what would your verdict be (circle one)? 
 
Guilty   Not Guilty 
 
 
 
2. Using the following scale, how likely is it that the defendant is actually guilty 
(circle one)? 
     Definitely              Definitely 
     not guilty    Neutral           guilty 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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This study is about decision making in a court case.  It is being conducted by Sara M. 
Locatelli for a dissertation under the supervision of Linda Heath in the Department of 
Psychology at Loyola University of Chicago.   
  
You are being asked to participate because you are eligible for jury service.  You must be 
at least 18 years of age to participate. 
 
If you agree to be in the study, you will be asked to:  
 Read a short news article. 
 Complete a questionnaire. 
 Read an abbreviated trial transcript. 
 Render a verdict. 
 
There are no foreseeable risks involved in participating in this research beyond those 
experienced in everyday life.  There are no direct benefits to you from participation, but 
the results will be helpful in understanding reactions to trials.     
 
Your results will be completely confidential.  Your name will not be attached to any 
materials, and only the researcher will have access to the data. 
 
Participation in this study is voluntary.  If you do not want to be in this study, you do not 
have to participate.  Even if you decide to participate, you are free not to answer any 
question or to withdraw from participation at any time without penalty.   
 
If you have questions about this research study, please feel free to contact Sara Locatelli 
at shouse1@luc.edu or the faculty sponsor, Linda Heath, at lheath@luc.edu.  
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the 
Loyola University Office of Research Services at (773) 508-2689.       
 
When you are finished reading this form, return it to the experimenter to receive your 
study packet.  By completing the packet, you are providing consent to participate in the 
research. 
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You have been participating in a study on jury decision making and the effect of pretrial 
publicity.  Pretrial publicity is defined as any media coverage of a case not yet in trial.  
Past research has shown that pretrial publicity, or PTP, can bias final verdicts in a trial.   
Before reading the case, you received a news article.  Some of you received only neutral 
information about the case, and the rest of you received one piece of biasing information 
(that the defendant had confessed, was convicted of a similar crime, or failed to cooperate 
with police during arrest).  You then completed a measure of legal attitudes, and read the 
trial transcript.  At the end of the trial, some of you received standard jury instructions, 
while the rest of you received more specific instructions, in which you were asked to 
ignore pretrial information.  It is expected that the negative information from the news 
article will only bias verdicts of people with strong legal attitudes.  It is also expected that 
the instructions to ignore PTP will work on people with moderate legal attitudes, but not 
people with strong attitudes. 
This research is ongoing, so please do not discuss the study with anyone.  If you have any 
questions or would like to receive a copy of the results of this study, please contact Sara 
Locatelli at shouse1@luc.edu. 
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